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Dear Readers,

After several years of editing – for this publication and others – I have come to understand what is the most difficult task of the editor. Contrary to popular conception, the difficulty does not arise not when there is much editing to be done. It is rather when there are few corrections to be made.

When the text in front of you contains almost no errors, when your red pen becomes relaxed in your hand from the lack of illogical premises, or when you start underlining sentences and lines simply because of their intellectual or artistic merit, it is then that you begin to question yourself. Is there nothing left for me to do? Has it really come to this? What is the point of being an editor if there is nothing to edit? Must I be forced to read intelligent pieces for the rest of my life, calling pleasure work and work pleasurable? This does not seem right…I must be doing something wrong. Let me reread this poem by Ed Houser, or this essay by Keelin Des Rosiers. Let me study this painting by Dario Buchelli or analyze this essay by Teresa Blackman. No. They are all intelligent, all coherent, all engaging.

This is what being an editor of the Scholar is like. A strenuous task, as you can see. We hope you may find our efforts to compile these creations as worthwhile to your reading experience as they have been to ours. And if you are lucky, just as taxing.

Alexa Turczynski
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Why Saint Bernard?
Joseph White

In Dante Alighieri’s *Paradiso*, the poet chooses an unexpected Saint Bernard as Dante’s last guide, leaving the reader with unanswered questions. Why does the poet choose Saint Bernard, and why does Beatrice not take Dante to the innermost portion of heaven? These questions are puzzling to first time readers and even scholars of the *Divine Comedy*. Robert Hollander, a renowned Dante scholar, points out that if there needs to be a third and final guide for Dante, then a logical choice would be Saint Lucy because she delivered the message to Beatrice from Mary to send Dante on a journey through Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven (Dante, Hollander ed. 782 n. 102). Hollander goes on to say, “One sympathizes with those who feel that there is something ungainly about the substitution of Bernard for Beatrice” (Dante, Hollander ed. 782 n. 102). Therefore, Bernard’s appearance can seem odd and illogical to many readers. Moreover, Bernard appears in the epic at a critical moment in Dante’s journey by which his appearance would seem to suggest that the poet highly values Saint Bernard and the role he plays in the work. His first appearance comes in the Tenth Heaven: the Celestial Rose, which marks the beginning of Dante’s first-hand encounters with Mary and the Trinity. Thus, Bernard leads Dante to the most intimate moments he has with God, leaving readers in need of understanding the reason the poet uses Bernard. The poet of the *Commedia* uses Beatrice to symbolize the bride of Christ, the church, and themes of marriage so that Dante can utilize his relationship with Beatrice to lead him to his own spiritual marriage with God. The poet logically uses Saint Bernard as the last guide because Dante must move beyond the relationship of Beatrice and Christ to that of Dante and Christ, and this progression of a soul to Christ originates from Bernard’s theology of a soul’s spiritual marriage to God.

Before discussing the specifics of Dante’s use of Bernard, it is useful to understand who Saint Bernard is and his importance in the Catholic Church. Saint Bernard is named a doctor of the Church for his many developments of the theology of mysticism, Mary, and monastic life. Also, he is a founding father of the Cistercian order because early in his life he was named abbot in
one of the new foundations associated with the Cistercians. He dealt with many problems facing the monastic life at the time, and established sixty-eight more foundations for the order. While Bernard made enormous achievements within the Cistercian order, he developed essential theology concerning the soul and its relationship and union to God (Zerbi 307-311). He analyzed the Song of Songs in depth, and his study led him to the understanding of the soul’s final goal in his or her relationship with God. In “Bernard of Clairvaux, St.,” the Catholic Encyclopedia explains Bernard’s belief in the complete union of the soul to God: “Love [God] wants to unite the soul to itself by charity even to the extent of mystical nuptials or spiritual marriage” (Zerbi 310). He truly wanted to express the soul’s union with the Divine as a complete self-gift through the idea of marriage (Zerbi 307-311).

The understanding of Saint Bernard’s theology of a spiritual marriage with God is important because the poet incorporates this theology in the Commedia. He understands marriage as a selfless uniting of spirits. He further explains this in one of his sermons when he says, “I am only speaking the language of St. Paul, who has said that ‘He who is joined [married] to the Lord is one Spirit’ [1 Corinthians 6:17]” (Bernard vol. 1 31.371). He thus understands marriage as two becoming one. Bernard, in another sermon, defines the greatest love a soul can obtain as: “the spiritual marriage of the soul with the Word [God]” (Bernard vol. 2 83.493). He is speaking of the highest love, but nevertheless he understands true love as a spiritual marriage. This love is a complete giving of self so that in return the spirit can receive the spouse fully (Sommerfeldt 53). John Sommerfeldt, in his book Bernard of Clairvaux on the Spirituality of Relationship, gives a great explanation of Bernard’s understanding of married love. He says, “Married love is, in one sense, the most complete form of human love, since it engages all the faculties of the soul—intellect, will, and feelings—and the body as well” (Sommerfeldt 55). The poet of the Commedia uses Bernard’s theology to structure Dante’s journey toward God.

In accord with Saint Bernard’s theology, the Divine Comedy presents an underlying theme of marriage as Dante approaches and journeys through Heaven. The first major sign of this theme appears when Dante sees Beatrice for the first time in Canto XXX of Purgatorio. Beatrice enters the Earthly Paradise on a chariot pulled by the Griffin, and one of the Seven-Stars begins to sing “Veni, sponsa, de Libano” (Dante, Mandelbaum ed. 30.11) which Mandelbaum translates as “Come, bride, from Lebanon” (Dante, Mandelbaum ed. 697 n. 11). This scene begins to resemble a wedding with Beatrice as the bride and the griffin as the bridegroom. Dante’s first encounter with his primary guide through Heaven takes place in what seems to be a wedding. This marks the introduction the reader receives to the reoccurring theme of marriage.

Furthermore, the poet uses more suggestive language throughout the rest of Purgatorio and Paradiso. The next encounter with the idea of marriage comes later on in Purgatorio after Dante awakes from a long sleep in Canto XXXII. The poet relates Dante’s experience after being awakened to Peter, James, and John’s reaction to seeing Jesus after being transfigured. The poet goes on to describe what the redemption through Jesus will bring: “endless
wedding-feasts in Heaven” (Alighieri, Mandelbaum ed. 32.76). This description reveals the poet’s understanding of the theology of Heaven as never ending celebrations of the many weddings to occur with the souls and God, thus, giving further evidence for the theme of marriage.

Lastly, in Canto XXXI of the *Paradiso* just before the entrance of Saint Bernard, the poet explains the many saints that surround Christ in Heaven as “the host that Christ, through His own blood, had taken as His bride” (Alighieri, Mandelbaum ed. 31.3-4). The poet reveals the theology of the marriage of Christ and the Church. “The host” he refers to is the saints surrounding Christ, but the saints are symbolic of the entire Church (Alighieri, Mandelbaum ed. 785). This gives the reader another example of how the theology that the poem incorporates within the *Commedia* involves the understanding of union represented by marriage. The reference to the marriage of Christ and the Church indicates the theology of union the poet uses.

The marriage themes and the Church representing the bride of Christ help the reader understand how Beatrice serves as a symbol of the Church within the *Commedia*. The poet introduces the idea of Beatrice symbolizing the church in the Earthly Paradise when the griffin pulls her in the chariot, and one of the Seven-Stars sings “Veni, sponsa, de Libano” at the end of *Purgatorio* (Alighieri, Mandelbaum ed. 30.11). As previously stated, the song is about a bride and originates from the *Song of Songs* (Alighieri, Mandelbaum ed. 697 n. 11). Rebecca Beal, a Dante scholar, in an article from an academic journal, explains what “sponsa” or “bride” refers to and implies in the context of the epic. Also, she states that this verse from the *Song of Songs* continues to say, “And you shall be crowned;,” this last part of the verse will be important to proving who “bride” refers to in the context of the epic.

Beal then gives her evidence for Beatrice symbolizing the Church: “[W]ith the great majority of exegetes, we understand “sponsa” as referring to the Church” (Beal 69). This first clause establishes that she and many Biblical scholars understand that Solomon in the *Song of Songs* refers to the church when he uses the word “sponsa”. Then, the question remains as to who in the context of the epic the bride refers to. However, Beal gives strong evidence to prove the bride refers to Beatrice: “Then, Beatrice’s coronation within the narrative of the *Commedia* further supports her role as Ecclesia” (Beal 69-70). The “coronation” Beal references is Beatrice being crowned in Canto X of the *Paradiso*. The crown has twelve stars which symbolizes “the preachers and teachers of the Church”, the twelve apostles (Beal 72). Therefore, since Beatrice is crowned just as the verse from Scripture promises, this crowning proves that “sponsa” refers to her.

Beatrice symbolizing the Bride of Christ makes her and Dante’s relationship more significant because Dante uses her relationship with Christ as a foundation for the way he lives his life and his future relationship with Christ. Their relationship first began when Dante was nine and Beatrice was eight, and they encountered each other at a neighborhood feast, which started Dante’s infatuation. From that moment until the end of *Paradiso*, Dante thought she was the most beautiful woman he had ever seen (Boccaccio 18-25). Even from
the beginning, Beatrice had a special role in leading Dante to a life of virtue. Beatrice’s role becomes evident to the reader in Canto XXX of Purgatorio when Beatrice speaks to Dante after the ice has just burst from his heart. She says, “Showing my youthful eyes to him, I led him with me toward the way of righteousness” (Dante, Mandelbaum ed. 30.122-123). The inner and outward beauty Dante sees in Beatrice even at a young age encourages him to live righteously. Beatrice becomes Dante’s model of a saintly life, and he uses her image as motivation to live a virtuous life.

However, Beatrice dies at the age of twenty-four, and her image in Dante’s mind begins to fade. Dante begins to fall away from the virtuous life and the love Beatrice had taught him. Beatrice explains this in her speech continued from earlier, “He took himself away from me and followed after another; when from flesh to spirit, I had risen” (Dante, Mandelbaum ed. 30.125-128). The other love that she refers to is the love of other worldly goods which did not lead Dante to the Supreme Good, God.

Nevertheless, when Dante starts the journey through Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven, he starts to refocus on Beatrice after he hears she was one of the women who asked him to go on the journey. The image of Beatrice begins again to motivate him throughout the journey that leads him to virtue and God. One of the most pivotal moments when the thought of her motivates him to continue is when he must go through the flames in the terrace of the lustful in Purgatorio. Virgil reminds him of her, which then motivates Dante to suffer the pain of the flames in order to be purged of his lust. Therefore, Beatrice’s image, yet again, gives Dante a model to follow and helps him to live more righteously.

The way Dante uses Beatrice and her relationship with Christ as a model for himself accords with Bernard’s theology on how an individual soul should reach a spiritual marriage with God. Bernard does this by saying the marriage of the Church and Christ should be used as an image for each individual soul. Theresa Moritz in her article “The Church as Bride in Bernard of Clairvaux’s Sermons on the Song of Songs” gives a good summary of Bernard’s understanding of the soul using the Church’s marriage to Christ as a model. She says, “Bernard places the marriage of Christ and the Church before the union of Christ and the soul...he consistently speaks first of the Church and Christ and then uses their union as a model for the relationship which he urges the individual soul to seek” (Moritz 3). Dante’s use of Beatrice and her marriage to Christ in his journey exemplifies this process Bernard believes a soul should follow in order for the soul to become married to Christ. Therefore, Bernard’s theology, which matches the poet’s, must be used to explain why the poet chooses to have St. Bernard replace Beatrice.

Dante needs a different guide because Beatrice symbolizes the Church. He has used her marriage to God as a guide for himself, but now he must enter into a personal spiritual marriage with God. As stated earlier, Beatrice helped Dante live a more virtuous life, and she led him to God. She gives him the tools he needs to have his own personal spiritual marriage. Thus, Bernard’s taking Beatrice’s place logically makes sense because Dante needs to
move beyond the marriage of Beatrice and Christ and make a spiritual marriage of Dante and Christ. No one can guide Dante better than the writer of the theology of a soul being united to God in marriage.

Not only does the author correctly choose Bernard as the final guide, but perfectly places the change of Bernard for Beatrice after Dante has been tested by Peter, James, and John about the three Christian virtues, because these tests symbolize Dante’s knowledge of the Church. All three of these saints are writers of the Scriptures, and Peter is also known as the first pope of the Church. By Dante passing the tests from these Church leaders, he proves that he has mastered the good of the relationship between the Church and Christ. Now, Dante must journey to attain one spirit with God; thus, the poet gives him Bernard, to lead him to this spiritual marriage with God. Therefore, Bernard must replace Beatrice as the guide through Paradise so that Dante and God can become one.

Understanding the poet’s use of Saint Bernard as the last guide helps the reader to know Dante’s true goal in his journey. Dante constantly journeys towards God, and he uses Beatrice as his main model throughout his life and journey, but he cannot only use Beatrice in order to reach his goal. He must have Saint Bernard help him reach his final goal of perfecting his personal unity with God.
Works Cited
The President of the United States has several constitutional powers which have historically ensured him the leading role in external relations, whereas Congress maintains the upper hand in domestic affairs. Some consider the distinction to be so complete that the executive essentially has free rein when it comes to issues of international politics, leaving the Senate with only a negligible role. In practice, presidents have exercised broad and often extra-constitutional powers in order to promote U.S. interests in North America and abroad, and to a surprising extent the Court has upheld such actions. Despite these efforts, the exercise of prerogative in foreign affairs has frequently exceeded the authority envisioned by the Framers, and the arguments used to defend unilateral executive action are not sufficiently convincing. Probably the most erroneous justifying argument is the claim that the executive is the “sole organ” of external dealings and is only limited by the Constitution in domestic matters. Congress has responded by overstepping its own boundaries while seeking to rein in the executive.

John Locke distinguishes in his *Second Treatise* between the “executive” power to enforce the law and the “federative” power which extends to “War and Peace, Leagues and Alliances, and all the Transactions” with those outside the commonwealth. This latter power, though usually combined in the same office as the first, “is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive Laws, than the Executive; and so must necessarily be left to the Prudence and Wisdom of those whose hands it is in, to be managed for the publick good.” (Locke, *Second Treatise*, §§ 145-147.) Federative power vis-à-vis other nations arises from man’s inherent ability to interact with fellow men. Locke’s conception of the federative power thus conforms to his idea of prerogative, with neither depending on positive laws. As Leonard Feldman writes, they are “not established by the constitution of the society; they can both … be understood as natural powers.” (Feldman, in ed. Fatovic 77) So, if one takes the perspective offered by Locke, federative power is a set of abilities which must by nature be present in a government just as nature is in individuals. In most cases, this power is placed in the same person as the executive for practical considerations, because both make use of the force and apparatus of the state and their disunity would threaten the commonwealth.

When they believe an issue of national interest is at stake, presidents have tended to address threats and opportunities pragmatically, as Locke might have expected, apparently showing only a secondary concern for legal niceties. Prominent but controversial early examples of unilateral action include George Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality in 1793 and Thomas Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase in 1803(So faer,103-227). Abraham Lincoln also engaged in a host of direct executive actions at the outbreak of the Civil War, and proceeded without prior Congressional approval in issuing the Emancipation Proclama-
tion of 1863. However, even if secondary to the national interest, adherence to the Constitution was a serious matter for each of these presidents. Washington consulted his cabinet and considered convening Congress for the aforementioned occasion, later obtaining legislative consent and even praise. (Cooper, 124) Jefferson, himself a critic of unilateral executive action, could go forward in good conscience only because he believed that either of the other branches had the ability to nullify his purchase. Lincoln in both cases pursued every alternative until “no choice was left but to call out the war power of the Government,” and was careful to obtain ex post facto Congressional approval for his actions (Lincoln, in Basler, ed. 423-426). Regarding lesser issues of enforcement, the nineteenth century saw “many instances of unauthorized force by the chief executive,” mainly in dealing with pirates, slave traders and criminals, but these “came to be recognized in practice as constitutionally permissible” since they aligned with international law (Van Wyne and Thomas, 11).

Presidential foreign power expanded in the twentieth century after a string of relatively weak executives during the Reconstruction years. Theodore Roosevelt involved himself in world affairs from Panama to the Philippines, providing a model for the visionary, progressive presidency. He wrote of the office: “My belief was that it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws” (Roosevelt, 197). Woodrow Wilson, who also played a defining role in developing the modern, rhetorical presidency, attributed the change in part to the primacy of the executive in the international scene. Describing the evolution of the office, he explained: “Foreign questions became leading questions … and in them the President was of necessity leader. Our new place in the affairs of the world has … kept him at the front of our government, where our own thoughts and the attention of men everywhere is centered on him” (Woodrow Wilson, in Pestritto, ed., 178). Meanwhile, Chief Justice and former president William Howard Taft denied the existence of an “undefined residuum” of federative or prerogative power, arguing that “the President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of power” (Taft, 139-140). But Roosevelt’s and Wilson’s interpretation won out in the end. In 1930, Charles E. Hughes succeeded Taft, and it was long before the Court began to endorse Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s expansive use of the office.

A remarkable 7-1 decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation (1936) represented an important turning point. The opinion was written by Justice Sutherland, who argued that “the federal power over external affairs in origin and essential character [is] different from that over internal affairs,” and that “[i]n this vast external realm … the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation” (Sutherland, q. in Genovese and Spitzer, 165). Referring to a speech which John Marshall had made when serving in the House of Representatives, Sutherland proclaimed the “plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations” (Cooper, 125). Louis Fisher, one of the foremost scholars on the separation of powers, says of the case that
it was “a badly reasoned, badly grounded decision” (Fisher, 57). For example, he points out the inaccuracy of the claim that external sovereignty never resided in the states but passed directly from the British monarch to the Union. Marshall’s “sole organ” expression was also clearly taken out of context. Summing up the deficiencies of the sweeping historical and constitutional arguments made in this case, Fisher observes: “Seldom has a court reached so far with so little evidence to support its conclusion” (Fisher, 58). Yet, despite all its flaws, Curtiss-Wright is often used as the legal precedent for unilateral executive action.

Regardless of what Locke and Sutherland have to say about the foreign relations power inherent in sovereignty, the Framers did not vest it entirely in the executive branch, nor did they establish a clear divide between internal and external powers. Article II of the Constitution enumerates all of the powers and duties of the President, including those connected with international politics and war. Section 2 makes him “commander and chief of the Army and Navy” and empowers him, with the Senate’s “advice and consent,” to “make treaties [and] appoint ambassadors.” In Section 3, the executive is commissioned to “receive ambassadors” and “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” while also being given the ability to convene Congress and recommend legislation (Art. II, §§ 2-3). The vesting clause in Section 1 has also been invoked as granting some unspecified presidential capacities. But in addition to Senate participation in appointments and treaties, the legislative branch is empowered to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” and “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.” Furthermore, Congress has a host of military powers: “To declare War, grant Letters of Mark and Reprisal,” and establish rules for these; “To raise and support Armies” and a Navy; “To make Rules for [their] Government and Regulation” and that of the militia (Art. I, § 8). Clearly, then, the executive has no monopoly with regard to external affairs.

Defenders of executive prerogative have used the “sole organ” theory and the “vesting clause thesis” to justify unilateral actions up to and including the unauthorized use of military force (Bradley and Flaherty, 548). But this runs contrary to the explicit statements of those often seen as having set precedents for broad presidential power. The Framers indicated no intent to establish an adventurous executive, and assigned him the conduct of war but not the making of it (Farrand, ed. 218-219). Executive advocate Alexander Hamilton assured the people of New York that the commander-in-chief power “would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it” (Hamilton, 416). As Tom Woods remarks: “That argument would have been absurd and dishonest if the Vesting Clause had given the president an additional reservoir of powers beyond those Hamilton catalogued” (Woods). Washington refrained from campaigning against the Indians on the grounds that this required Congressional authorization according to the Constitution. Lincoln denounced President Polk’s instigation of war with Mexico because there was no real threat of invasion and no formal decla-
ration (Van Wynen and Thomas, 11). Chief Justice Marshall himself, ruling on John Adams’s directions to seize ships during the “Quasi-War” of 1798-1800, invalidated the executive order: “The whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United States, vested in Congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this enquiry” (Sofaer, 162). So the “sole organ” argument is not supported even by its supposed progenitor.

Congress could perhaps have responded properly were it not so late in trying to limit the federative power, but it went too far once it finally chose to intervene. Like the courts, the legislature tends to shy from opposing the president during the midst of crises (Sofaer 205). If the House and Senate approve, they will rubber-stamp his actions; if not, the executive can be criticized for going out of line. Nevertheless, “the perceived abuses of emergency powers claims and military or other foreign policy necessities during the Johnson and Nixon years led to a string of legislative responses in the 1970s” (Cooper 13). The National Emergencies Act of 1974 helped to remedy the situation after a Senate committee found that, since the Truman administration, “some 470 special emergency powers had accumulated” which “‘confer enough authority to rule the country without reference to normal constitutional procedures” (Cooper, 39-40). Far more controversial is the War Powers Resolution, which attempted to define the roles of the branches in the war-making process (Holt,1). Passed over Nixon’s veto in 1973, it reasserted congressional authority over key decisions. Both the effectiveness and the constitutionality of the act are doubtful. As Caspar Weinberger puts it: “The problem is that one just cannot conduct foreign policy - one cannot do what the Constitution directs the president to do - if there is a legislative veto with such serious consequences hanging over the executive” (q in Crovitz and Rabkin, eds., 95). Up to this date, the conflict remains unresolved.

One might conclude upon reflection that Congress and the executive have been equally successful in squeezing the other out of their areas of respective advantage. While the legislature has encroached more and more upon the domestic sphere by overseeing policy through regulatory agencies, presidents have grown bolder and more independent as the “sole organ” in the exercise of foreign powers. Thus, the slight imbalances created by the Constitution in these areas have grown to grossly uneven divides, with one branch dominating internal affairs and the other external. Describing the situation in Locke’s terminology, the executive power of the presidency has been diminished over time, but the federative power has increased in proportion.
Bibliography


Emerson’s “Give All to Love” presents an initially peculiar view of love. In the first half, the speaker advocates surrendering all to love, but in the second half, he advises the speaker to be detached from his beloved and willing to surrender even her. Were the poem otherwise titled, it would be tempting to view the two halves of the poem as incongruous as Richard O’Keefe does in *Mythic Archetypes in Ralph Waldo Emerson*. To his mind, the poem is split in twain into an endorsement of erotic love and its subsequent repudiation for the sake of attaining divine values superior to love. For O’Keefe, the feature “most disturbing about this poem is that the same speaker who can attribute so much to love is able to change his mind so categorically and equally advocate its surrender” (13). However, if the neoplatonic influences of Emerson’s transcendentalism are considered, then the Platonic concept of the ascent up the ladder of perfection resolves the conflict between the first and second half of the poem. Emerson’s eroticism does not take particular objects, not even a young woman, as its proper goal. Rather, he desires unnamed deities. Presumably one deity is Love, and the identity of at least one other may be inferred from “Ode to Beauty,” where the speaker pursues ideal Beauty. The differences in tone between these two poems are explicable by their different addressees. In “Ode to Beauty,” a seasoned lover of ideals desperately addresses the ever-elusive Beauty, and in “Give All to Love,” the speaker pedagogically initiates the reader into loving. Emerson’s neoplatonically informed understanding of love permits him to advocate separation from the beloved without contradicting his previous imperative to “Give All to Love.”

“Give All to Love” hearkens back to Diotima’s instructions for ascending the Ladder of Perfection in Plato’s *Symposium*. Thus the poem’s imperative holds even when the speaker advocates detachment from the beloved. Diotima tells Socrates that the soul being introduced to the mysteries of Beauty must not too quickly be allowed to give himself to the love of one body, and that he must soon be taught how alike is the beauty of all bodies. Then he must learn the superiority of the beauties of the soul, ascending from love of institutions and laws to love of knowledge in every science. Finally, he will attain the knowledge of Beauty itself. The soul’s love progresses from finding its object in particular beautiful things to finding it in increasingly spiritualized beauties. In the same way, the speaker in “Give All to Love” advises the listener to give everything to love, which “High and more high / … dives into noon” (11-12). The image is that of a heavenward ascent. Surrendering “Friends, kindred, days, / Estate, good fame, / Plants, credit, and the Muse—” and the beloved, herself, facilitates this upward movement (3-5). In both Plato and Emerson the erotic gaze must rise to the Divine from lesser objects, be they earthly as day or heavenly as the Muse.

Admittedly, Plato and Emerson do not agree as to the ordering of the rungs on said Ladder, only that one must climb them. Emerson elevates sexual love of a maiden above friends, good fame, and the Muse. Plato, in contrast,
considers love of soul between friends to be higher than physical love. Further, Plato considered those who sought to win immortality through fame—whether through glorious actions or intellectual works—to possess spiritual rather than merely fleshly fecundity (Symposium 208 c). Emerson calls love a god, but Plato considers him a demi-god because he is not the Beautiful itself, but longs for it (Symposium 204 d). For all the differences between them, Plato and Emerson both agree that the follower of Eros must not cling to particular beautiful bodies but rise beyond them to more universal beauty (Symposium 211 c), for “When half-gods go, / The gods arrive” (38-39). Thus the speaker’s insistence that the reader should be willing to let his beloved go, “Though thou loved her as thyself;” does not evince that love is devalued (43) . Rather, relinquishing the young woman is necessary for the gods to arrive.

The identity of the unnamed gods is one of the great interpretive questions of the poem. As the speaker has already identified love as a god, it seems reasonable that he is one of the gods referred to. Presumably then, when the young woman has gone, the great god of love will come again. Yet greater gods than he must also come. If Plato is correct that love is born of need—the beloved’s parting “dims the day, / Stealing grace from all alive” —then love, upon his return, would bring the keen longing for her who is gone or for another to take her place (45-46). It hardly seems that one could “heartily know” this longing to be a god and take consolation in the belief that the longing is superior to its object, so the gods must be greater than the beloved or the longing for her. The objection may be raised that Emerson’s understanding of love might be different enough from Plato’s that love is itself its own reward and does not need to be superseded by a greater deity. After all, he does not follow Plato in ascribing only partial divinity to love. However, the expression of frustrated longing in “Ode to Beauty,” illustrates that Emerson does not consider loving its own satisfaction.

Beauty has captured the speaker’s heart, and he is ever drawn toward her without reaching her. He asks, “Who gave thee, O Beauty, / The keys of this breast,—” (1-2). He recognizes her as “Guest of million painted forms, / Which in turn thy glory warms!” (23-24). He sees her in innumerable particulars, and they only add to her brilliance. In this way, the particulars do not necessarily obstruct the erotic desire for beauty; on the contrary, “The sun and sea, / Informed by thee, / Before me run, / And draw me on” (39-42). The speaker glimpses ideal Beauty and pursues it rather than the illumined particulars. Yet the speaker cannot obtain her. He complains “Thou . . . .Wilt not give the lips to taste / Of the nectar which thou hast” (81). The divide between the self and Ideal Beauty rests on the Neoplatonic understanding of the relation between the two.

Emerson’s Neoplatonic thought was largely influenced by Plotinus, but he was repulsed by Plotinus’ doctrine that the self would be annihilated upon reaching union with the divine (Brodwin 465) . This repulsion finds its expression in “Ode to Beauty” and illumines the relation of the self to particulars in “Give All to Love.” Emerson ends the ode with the cry, “Dread Power, but dear! if God thou be, / Unmake me quite, or give thyself to me!” (97-98).
Brodwin sees the final lines of the ode to express the anguish of a man who has realized the crisis of the Plotinic mystic: “Union or mystical immersion in Beauty can only be achieved at the expense of the poet’s loss of self-consciousness” (Brodwin 476). The poet is offered either annihilation, should the ultimate sacrifice of self be required, or immortality, if divine Beauty should give itself to him (477). The former is repugnant to him; in *Nature* he reproves theosophists for coming to despise matter, noting that “Plotinus was ashamed of his body” (*Emerson’s ‘Nature’* 27-28). However, Emerson cannot be assured of winning immortality, for it may be that Beauty, the “eternal fugitive,” that is false to him in life—ever but a tease—may be false to him in death (“Ode to Beauty” 74). For this reason he “dare not die / In Being’s deeps past ear and eye, / Lest there [he] find the same deceiver” (94-96). The distress of this poem could hardly be more different from the blithe optimism of “Give All to Love.” The latter poem’s pedagogic interests are not served by making this crisis apparent. Emerson advises that following love “requireth courage stout,” but just how stout goes unspoken (19). Although, if one must have strength to give up a woman “loved as thyself,” then one must implicitly have the strength to give up oneself.

Fortunately, “Give All to Love,” features an optimistic reconciliation of particularity and universality not found in Plato. The reader has the promise that the goods that he relinquishes to love “shall return / More than they were, / And ever ascending” (23-25). Here the pursuit of Beauty will improve those things that were relinquished, they shall not merely be discarded. The value of particulars thus affirmed reveals an element of Emerson’s philosophy not found in Platonic thought: the mind’s movement down the Ladder of Perfection to perceive the parts in light of the whole. In his essay *Plato*, Emerson discusses the mind’s inner necessity to see the causes of effects, to see the causes of these causes, and to continue peering up the chain of causality to the final cause—the Divine One. But it is equally necessary for the mind to return from the One down the sequence of effects (Miller 389). Norman Miller believes this necessary, twofold movement opens the gateway to Emerson’s core philosophical notion that nature is a dynamic symbol of the spiritual world, a terminus of the spiritual world’s operations and the impetus for further imagination and wisdom (Miller 391). The full richness of Emerson’s notion of the material is not conveyed in “Give All to Love,” but the assurance that these items will be given back dovetails with Emerson’s sense of their value. The giving back of particulars may even give one cause to hope that one’s own particular self may be returned as well.

“Give All to Love” is initially a jarring, somewhat confusing poem, but recourse to Emerson’s philosophy resolves these difficulties. The title of the poem is in no way ironic; the speaker does believe that his addressee must give all to love, but this pupil must be educated in the true nature of love. He must be guided beyond attachments to particulars, even to his beloved, to learn how to love divine Beauty. The speaker admits the trials involved in such loving, but does not plumb their full depth. “It was never for the mean,” but just how one may pay in anguish is not explored here (18). Emerson does not know
what ultimately lies at the end of the lover’s journey. One may find bliss, union, or frustration. Still, Emerson is certain that it is better to run the race than to sit idly by. Maybe the upward journey is doomed to fall short even as Tantalus’ upward stretched fingers just closed upon, yet caught not, the apple dangled before him by the gods. Even so, man’s glory is in the reaching, and Emerson’s optimism impels him to reach upward hopefully with one hand and draw his pupils onward with the other.

Works Cited
Poem of Poems: Fear of the Lord and Wisdom in Sirach 1:14-21
By Katherine Schweers

Wisdom is praised throughout the Old Testament, and its pursuit is often described as the work of a lifetime. It can be a somewhat challenging concept and hard to define, and, perhaps, even harder to attain. The book of Sirach begins with a poem on Wisdom, and the book puts wisdom side-by-side with another challenging concept: fear of the Lord. These two ideas together serve to shed light on each other and to help the reader to pursue both. The poem, found in Sirach 1:11-30, can be divided in different ways to decipher what exactly this relationship is between the fear of the Lord and wisdom. There is one part of the larger poem, a middle section found in verses 14-21, which, I propose, is a distinct section within the larger poem that serves a unifying function in the text and outlines a bold way of viewing the fear of the Lord. The sub-poem serves to explain that the fear of the Lord is both the beginning and the end of wisdom.

14* Ἀρχὴ σοφίας φοβεῖται τὸν κύριον, καὶ μετὰ πιστῶν ἔν μήτρῃ συνεκτίσθη αὐτής.

15 Ἔν τοῖς ἄνθρώποις ἁμένοις ἰδέσθησαι καὶ μετά τοῦ σπέρματος αὐτῶν ἐμπιστευθῆσαι.

16 πληθυσμὸς σοφίας φοβεῖται τὸν κύριον καὶ μεθύσει αὐτοὺς ἀκατάστατον κάθοδον αὐτῆς.

17 πάντα ὑπὸ τὸν θεόν ἀνθρώποι διεστάλλησε ἐπιθυμημάτων καὶ τὰ ἀποδοξία ἀπὸ τὸν γεννήματος αὐτῆς.

18στεψανος σοφίας φοβος κυρίου ἀναθάλλους εἰρήνην καὶ ἐγγίζεις ψάκεις.

19 καὶ εἰσόρχησεν αὐτήν, ἐπιστῆμην καὶ γνῶθιν συνέδωκεν καὶ ἐξελάνθη καταστάσεις ἐξελάνθησαν καὶ διάδοξα κατατόντων αὐτῆς ἀναψώσαν.

20 ὅλα σοφίας φοβοῖ τὸν κύριον καὶ οἱ κλάδοι αὐτῆς μετρημένοις.

21 φοβος Κυρίου ἀμαρτηματα, παραμένεις δὲ ἀποστρέψω ὀργήν

The division of the poem is somewhat disputed. As a whole, verses 1:11-30 comprise a poem of twenty-two bicola, the same number of letters in the Hebrew alphabet (Crenshaw 650). The poem identifies wisdom with fear of the Lord, and it ends with a warning against loss of self-control (Crenshaw 650). Further dividing the poem is more contested. The Jerome Biblical Commentary divides the text into three parts, and it divides the section I am proposing as a single cohesive sub-poem into two different sections, verses 9-18 and verses 19-29, a section on fear of the Lord and obtaining wisdom, respectively.
(Brown 543). Other scholars, like James L. Crenshaw in the *New Interpreters Bible*, prefer not to divide the text, seeing it rather as a single unit that is bound together by various themes and images (Crenshaw 650). I agree more with the view of the *Jerome Biblical Commentary* which views the poem as having three parts, but I disagree about how it is divided. It seems that in the middle section, verses 14-21 make up a single section within the work. Verses 1-13 discuss wisdom primarily, and fear of the Lord to a lesser extent, but never are they discussed side-by-side or in relation to one another. The first section is primarily focused on Wisdom. Verses 14-21, however, possess some unique features within the poem that separate it from the surrounding text. While the rest of the poem never relates wisdom and fear of the Lord, they are related to one another with the approximate formula “the [feature] of wisdom is to fear the Lord” four separate times within verses 14-21. Furthermore, these are spaced evenly from each other, creating four stanzas comprised of two bicolon each. Each begins with a thematic relationship of fear of the Lord and wisdom, with the following bicolon elaborating on that theme. This section or sub-poem found in verses 14-21 is followed by a section focused on the fear of the Lord, verses 22-30. I suggest that the entire poem, verses 1-30, is divided into three sections, with the sub-poem in verses 14-21 acting as a bridge between the initial section on wisdom and the later section on the fear of the Lord. It does this by showing how the two relate to each other: the fear of the Lord is the beginning and end of wisdom.

The governing relationship between wisdom and the fear of the Lord in this section is that it is the ἀρχή of wisdom—its beginning, origin, or first principle. This fits nicely at the start of the sub-poem because it says that if one wants to pursue wisdom, as the larger poem will go on to urge, one must begin with fearing of the Lord since it is the beginning of wisdom. ἀρχή can be rendered in one of three ways. It is the point of departure or starting point, the most important part of a thing, and the best part or essence of a thing (Skehan 144). Thus, the sub-poem begins by explaining that the point of departure or origin of wisdom is fear of the Lord. The verse goes on to emphasize with ἀρχή that wisdom is a gift that is infused at birth or before, seen in verse 14b where it is infused in the unborn (Skehan 144). In line with the generative theme of the section, it is also rich with familial imagery. Verse 14b explains that the origin is created in the μήτρα with the faithful, which could mean either the core or, most likely, the womb. It is present from the very beginning of life. Further, it shares the womb with them—it is intimate and familial with them, always at their side and never apart from them, even before their birth. Indeed, where fearing the Lord has been with the faithful from their conception, it is similarly passed down to their own seed or offspring, their σπέρματος, in verse 15b. Fearing of the Lord, the ἀρχή of wisdom, resides in the household, passing from one generation to the next. This theme is similarly picked up in verse 15a where the verb ἐνόσσευσε is used of the action of the ἀρχή. The word ἐνόσσευσε is not found elsewhere in the Septuagint, but is found elsewhere in Greek texts. Curiously, it is typically used of birds building their nests. This is how Aristotle uses the word, describing the action of a bird.
making a nest, and similarly it is found in Herodotus’ *Histories* for the action of nesting birds (*History of Animals* 559a4, *Histories* 1.159). The ἄρχη is spoken of like a mother bird, continuing the idea of the familial and intimate bond of the faithful with it.

The second stanza, verses 16-17, is governed by the relationship of fearing the Lord as the πλησμονή of wisdom. That is, it is the abundance, being-filled, or the satiety of wisdom. Thus, the desire to understand the great universal things, wisdom, is filled and overfilled by fearing the Lord, which is its abundance or fullness. This creates the image of wisdom as something like food which is craved, and it is satiated by fear of the Lord. This food imagery is carried on into verse 16b, which states that fear of the Lord, the abundance or satiety of wisdom, is like drink in that it intoxicates (μεθύσκει) the faithful.

The sub-poem begins in the first stanza with familial imagery and shifts to the image of an abundance of food or goods. It intoxicates them by its καρπῶν, its fruits, seeds, or profits. Like a tree, the fear of the Lord blooms and produces fruit, and its profits are able to over-fill those who have it, intoxicating them. Thus, this stanza is governed by the idea of the superabundant richness of fear of the Lord as the satiety of wisdom.

The third section is governed by fear of the Lord as the crown of wisdom, bringing mastery and leadership. Fear of the Lord is said to be the στέφανος of wisdom, which is typically rendered as “crown.” It can, however, have deeper implications. The word can signify a wreath, a crown of victory, or a badge of office. It can thus connote a certain completeness or mastery, an achievement. Much like the preceding section which likened fear of the Lord to the fullness of wisdom, this section suggests that the fear of the Lord is the end, completeness, or the accomplishment of wisdom. Further, this mastery and crown makes εἰρήνεν to flourish. The Greek word εἰρήνεν has more meaning than its English translation, peace. It includes the ideas of well-being, prosperity, serenity, proper vertical and horizontal relationships, tranquility, safety, contentment, and satisfaction (Skehan 145). Verse 18b is a challenging passage, not just in the subtleties of dealing with a complex word like εἰρήνεν, but also in rendering the phrase υγίειν σωσίας, which I have rendered as “soundness of health.” Thus it seems that the crown of wisdom brings with it a peace both internal and external – it brings tranquility of relationships, prosperity, and the internal tranquility of perfect health.

Verse 19 is an exceptionally complex passage. It is sometimes missing from translations entirely, and, when present, its meaning can remain entirely elusive. Firstly, the subject of the verbs εἰδεν and εξηρίθμησεν (to know and to enumerate, respectively) is not stated explicitly and left to be inferred from context. It can be read that the subject is wisdom, and that αὐτήν is reflexive, thus giving a translation like “she knows and enumerates herself.” This would suggest that wisdom has a thorough and complete knowledge of herself. This would also make it seem that possessing wisdom is a sharing in the internal self-knowledge of wisdom, that she knows herself and shares that with others, as is elaborated in verse 19b. On the other hand, many translators view the subject of εἰδεν and εξηρίθμησεν as the Lord, giving the translation “He both
knows and enumerates it [or her].” This translation shifts the focus to the divine origin of wisdom, emphasizing the intimate relationship between God and wisdom, as well as his desire to share that with man. I favor the latter translation. This is because of a curious shift that occurs in this stanza of the sub-poem. The other three stanzas of the sub-poem each similarly contain a relationship between fear of the Lord and wisdom, but this stanza shifts the language slightly. The other three explain that some attribute of wisdom is the fear of the Lord, such as its beginning or fullness, using the phrase “[the attribute] σοφίας φοβεῖσθαι τὸν κύριον.” Thus, literally it could be rendered “[the attribute] of wisdom is to fear the Lord.” This stanza, however, begins with the phrase “στέφανος σοφίας φόβος κυρίου,” (“the crown of wisdom is fear of the Lord”), Where the other three stanzas use the infinitive, saying that to fear the Lord is what is in relation to wisdom, this paragraph uses the noun, fear of the Lord. Thus, the Lord is not, in this sentence, the object of the fear, but rather the possessor. Fear that belongs to the Lord is the crown of wisdom. This puts the Lord in a more prominent role in this relationship. I contend that this supports the translation that the Lord is then the subject of the later verbs. Sirach, in breaking from the previous pattern, is signaling that there is a change in this stanza, and this change is that the Lord is now the subject.

Verse 19c states that the crown of wisdom, the fear of the Lord, raises up the δόχαν of its rulers. Δόχαν is a complex word that could be and often is translated as “glory,” showing that a leader who has the crown of wisdom is esteemed. I choose to render it as judgment due to the theme of the stanza. It shows that a leader who has the crown of wisdom, and thus has a certain mastery, is best able to carry out his job, making judgments, because of it.

The final stanza, verses 20-21, completes a sort of inclusio of the sub-poem which started in the first stanza. Both the first and the last stanzas center on how wisdom comes from or originates in fearing the Lord while the two middle stanzas explain how the highest point or fullness of wisdom is fear of the Lord. This points to a theme within the sub-poem: that the start and end of wisdom is to fear the Lord. The fear of the Lord is both the beginning point and also the fullness or end of wisdom. The fourth stanza specifically focuses on the root of wisdom being to fear the Lord. This stanza is primarily focused on plant imagery. Ρίζα I render as root, in line with the plant theme of the poem. That is, fearing the Lord is the foundation of wisdom, that from which it springs, its stock. Ρίζα can even be rendered as family or sect. That is, it could be seen that “the family of wisdom is to fear the Lord.” This harkens back to the familial imagery of the first stanza, solidifying the inclusio. Further, it is described as having κλάδοι, branches. The branches of the tree of wisdom, which has fear of the Lord as its roots, are μακροημέρευσις, length of days.

It essentially leads into the following section of the poem, which describes the value of patience and self-control in dealing with anger, yet its focus on the fear of the Lord associates it with the preceding sub-poem. Thus, the verse seems to be a sort of bridge that transitions from the poem into the rest of the work. Verse 21b especially states that fear of the Lord turns back wrath,
οργήν, which could be rendered also as natural impulse, anger, or passion. Clement of Alexandria says on the verse that God can seem angry at times in Scripture, but it is not so much that God is angry, He is restrained. He simply uses this to produce fear which drives away sin (Lienhard 181). Further, fear of the Lord seems to take on this character of driving out what is primal, natural impulse, and elevating a person. Indeed, it turns back wrath. This could be because piety and fear of the Lord calms the anger of others, or that it calms one’s own anger, providing peace and tranquility as described in stanza three.

The fear of the Lord is shown in the sub poem in Sirach 14-21 to be both the beginning and end of wisdom. Wisdom is considered one of the greatest goods one can strive for. Philosophy is simply love of wisdom, and a large section of scripture is dedicated to wisdom. Yet it can be a sort of grand idea that is hard to grasp, define, or search for. The sub-poem serves an essential purpose within the entire poem and to scripture as a whole: it solidifies the idea that to fear the Lord is the beginning and end of wisdom, and thus, in order to start on the path of wisdom and reach its fullness, one must carry out this journey on a path of fearing the Lord. Wisdom can be essentially seen as an appreciation or knowledge of universal ideas; in essence it is the knowledge of universals, which can then be applied to one’s life in practical matters. One is, in wisdom, encountering what is far greater than one’s self. It is fitting, then, that the right reaction to first encountering this is fear and awe. But, in a rich way, this awe does not fade as one gains greater and more complete wisdom, but rather fear is also the fullness and completeness of wisdom. One is in awe when one first encounters great universals, but this awe only becomes greater and greater the more wise one is. Achieving wisdom does not make one satisfied with one’s self and comfortable in the world, but rather it puts one in awe of the greatness of the world and allows one to marvel at existence in trembling and fear. Particularly, it instills the proper fear of the greatest being in existence, the fear of the Lord.


An Elementary Poem
Tom Farris

I don’t know if I know what a poem is.
I may never have written a true poem before.
I hope I have, or if I haven’t I hope I will.
I know I’ve tried,
Putting words in an order,
Right or wrong,
Or into a beautiful disorder,
Silly or sublime.
Sometimes’ it’s like water,
A euphonious stream of constant
Pouring forth that overtakes
And lubricates the soul
With quick, clear, clean inspiration.
Other times it’s like a stone
That I chip at for a bit
Then come back later
And chip more off
For a long, involved, timely process
Until I have a well-hewn sculpture
Crafted into a fine, well-wrought monolith.
And then in a moment
It can burn me, consume me whole
And scorch scars into my skin
Which stay long after their branding.
But on some calm, bright days
When the world in young beauty wakes
To the marvel of a rare and wonderful peace,
A stillness that stops the turbulence of the heart,
The cool breeze blows, the soothing air
Winds across our face, the wind caressing
Our body, restoring our energies and faculties
For but a fraction of a second, yet we feel it
Deeply and write the line down as fast as we can.
And hope more days like that come
So we can finish the thing, for once.
Or, so I think.
Am I crazy? Or has this happened to you too?
Recollection: The Paradox of Wordsworth’s Experience
By Keelin des Rosiers

Wordsworth, like the other Romantics and especially Blake, was interested in the contrast and shift between Innocence and Experience found in the life of man. Innocence and Experience were, for Wordsworth, different states of existence. However, unlike Blake’s Innocence and Experience, those of Wordsworth were not as clear-cut and separate. Wordsworth’s Innocence and Experience have a confusing, paradoxical relationship. In his poem “Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood,” Wordsworth presents exactly what he sees as the distinction between the state of Innocence and the state of Experience. The narrator of the Ode—an experienced adult—recollects his early childhood and ponders the joys he felt then. It is exactly this act of recollection that creates the paradox found in Wordsworth’s Innocence and Experience: the innocent child looks to the man, imitating him; the experienced man looks back at the innocent child and recollects—and re-experiences on a different level—the original, innocent joy he once found there. The paradox is that Experience both causes man to lose his Innocence—because once Experience comes Innocence is lost—and allows man to recover the joy of Innocence through Recollection. Nature leads Innocence to Experience; Experience in turn is able to look back and recover, to some extent, Innocence. By his very act of writing a poem about his recollection, Wordsworth shows, through different images of light, how recollection can reconcile the loss of Innocence with the beginning of Experience by retrieving the lost joys of Innocence. Experience is not necessarily negative; it allows man to feel the joys of Innocence through Recollection. The paradox is that this Experience took away this Innocence in the first place.

In the first verse paragraph of the Ode, Wordsworth introduces his act of recollection, describing a time when all natural things seemed, “Apparelled in celestial light” (4). Nature, for Young Wordsworth, was filled with “the glory and the freshness of a dream” (5). Now, however, look though he may, Wordsworth notes, “The things which I have seen I now can see no more” (9). He describes how, although the natural world still functions the same as it did when he was a child, he is aware now “that there hath past away a glory from the earth” (18). The celestial light of childhood has dimmed. Here in these beginning verse paragraphs, Wordsworth sets up his image of celestial light and representing Innocence in all its heavenly glory. Even though this heavenly light has passed away, Wordsworth, through his recollection of it, is able to “hear the Echoes” (27). Wordsworth says he still feels the joys that were once present in nature, but as he now looks upon the same fields and trees, he realizes that something is gone, missing. Although he feels the same joys as his child self, he knows that there has come over him and his perceptions of nature a change. He asks, “Whither is fled the visionary gleam? / Where is it now, the glory and the dream?” (56-57).

The visionary, celestial dream has ceded its youthful Innocence to the Experience brought about by Nature. The fifth verse paragraph describes this
natural shift in terms very similar to Plato’s theory of Recollection. Wordsworth begins to answer his own questions by explaining, “Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting: / The Soul that rises with us, our life’s Star, / Hath had elsewhere its setting” (58-60). As in the Platonic theory, Wordsworth’s soul is born into a natural world where the forms that were known by it before are slowly forgotten. Innocence is the state of existence that comes the closest to the knowledge and remembrance of these forms. In fact, Wordsworth is so bold as to claim, “Heaven lies about us in our infancy!” (66).

One must understand how one moves from Innocence to Experience in order to understand what the paradoxical nature of these two states means. And so, Wordsworth describes this process beginning with the shade that starts to fall on the Boy who as yet “beholds the light” (69). Next, although the toils of life bring him farther away from the light of the glorious sun in the east, the Youth “still is Nature’s Priest” (72). The Youth still looks upon Nature and sees her celestial, dreamlike glow, but he must cling harder than ever before to see this light. Finally, “the Man perceives it die away, / And fade into the light of common day” (76). The earth has had her way; she has made Man “forget the glories he hath known” (83). No longer is nature surrounded by celestial light; it has now faded into the light of the common day. The shift from Innocence to Experience occurs when Nature loses its heavenly glow and is seen in its earthly hues. The experienced man has lost sight of the forms that he was so close to as a child; he is fully participating in life’s “forgetting” (58).

For Wordsworth, Innocence is a prophet and Experience is a philosopher. Innocence is a “Mighty Prophet! Seer blest!” because its exterior is at one with its interior—it is able to read the eternal deep because it is close to the Platonic forms (112; 114). Experience, on the other hand, is “toiling all our lives to find, / In darkness lost” (116-117). Experience has lost sight of the forms; it must toil to find them using the light of reason—darkness compared to the light of the heavens. Since Experience is no longer one with the forms it must use its reason and memory to attempt to find what it has forgotten. Wordsworth introduces in verse paragraphs seven and eight of the Ode this idea of the distinction between prophet and philosopher, but he also introduces what makes his Wordsworthian approach to Innocence and Experience so unique. He addresses the phenomenon of the child imitating the adult, “As if his whole vocation / Were endless imitation” (106-107). The innocent child looks ahead at the experienced adult and imitates him. In the Ode, the experienced Wordsworth looks back at the innocent Wordsworth and bemoans, “Why with such earnest pains doth thou provoke / The years to bring the inevitable yoke, / Thus blindly with thy blessedness at strife?” (123-125). Thus, Innocence looks to Experience and Experience looks back to Innocence.

In looking back at Innocence, the experienced man can find within himself the remnants of the innocent joy: “O joy! That in our embers / Is something that doth live, / That nature yet remembers / What was so fugitive!” (129-132). Innocence is fleeting; the celestial light fades with the arrival of Experience. However, through recollection, the memories “are yet the fountain light of all our day, / Are yet a master light of all our seeing” (151-152). Recollec-
tion, although not a celestial light, brings to Experience the joy of Innocence; it looks upon the embers of Innocence and redeiscovers the joys that were once present in the flames. It is through Recollection that the “light of the common day” is transformed into “a master light of all our seeing” (76; 152). Experience leads us out of the celestial light of Innocence into the common light of earth. Because the shift from Innocence to Experience is natural, the arrival of this “light of the common day” is inevitable (76). Recollection is that which makes man able to reconcile the loss of Innocence with the arrival of Experience. Recollection allows this common light to become this master of all our seeing. Recollection has “the power to make / Our noisy years seem moments in the being / Of the eternal Silence: truths that wake, / To perish never” (154-156). The experienced man recollects the joys of his innocent childhood, and, through remembering them, allows them never to perish. Recollection allows for the immortality of the joy of Innocence.

And so, at the end of his poem, Wordsworth re-visits the first scene. He re-visits the birds singing their joyous song and the lambs bounding to the tabor’s sound (19-21; 168-170). This time he goes with the knowledge that comes from Recollection; this time he has heard “the Echoes” and “will join [the] throng” (27; 171). Wordsworth knows he can never again see the glory in nature in the same way that he did as a child, but he no longer allows this thought to grieve him. He says, “We will grieve not, rather find / Strength in what remains behind” (179-180). Looking back at the joys of Innocence brings peace to the sufferings of Experience. The years “bring the philosophic mind” of Experience. This philosophic mind allows the experienced man to use Recollection—a capacity of his reason—to find the forms and beauties of Innocence. In this way Experience—the philosopher—recovers Innocence—the prophet.

Wordsworth, in his final verse paragraph, claims, “I love the Brooks which down their channels fret, / Even more than when I tripped lightly as they” (192-193). At the end of his recollection of childhood, Wordsworth has realized that, although the pure and heavenly joys of childhood have passed on, his experienced human heart can look upon nature and see that “the meanest flower that blows can give / Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears” (202-203). The feelings and emotions of his childhood toward nature were celestial and glorious, but the feelings and emotions of his adulthood toward nature are philosophic and deep. Innocence looks upon nature impulsively; Experience, because of its capacity for Recollection, looks upon nature knowingly and appreciatively. Now, with Experience, Wordsworth can better comprehend that which was “habitual” when he was a child (191).
Moth Cosmos
By Riley Roberts

A moth flies up from the sticky jar
Which she (as of now) inhabits,
Where she soars like Icarus kissing the sun,
Who is unaware of just how delicate
Moths are.
A little heart pitters and seized,
Which is all our dear moth can bear,
Where she feels her body cry at the effort,
Who is a cosmos so beautiful and rare,
A whisper.
An unaware, feeble voyager,
Which sees the warm glow of a flame,
Where she cannot gauge the distance
Between her and her flickering claim,
Who hunts for celestial union,
Yet is a moth all the same.
A7713
By Edward Houser

*inspired by Elie Wiesel's Night*

They took everything we had
our gold
our clothes
our homes
Anything we could not hide, we lost

Is it any wonder then
that i hid my soul
like treasure in the basement floor?
A7713
wasn't me
but a mask
a cloak
a tattoo shield
whatever horror i saw, i heard, i smelled, i touched
it couldn't touch me there
it happened to A7713
not to me
and i hid inside of him
building my fortress
brick after brick
as he cringed from blow after blow
deeper and deeper i dove
to escape the storm above

but then it was over
and i went to look for myself
inside A7713

i couldn't find me

buried too deep
i was lost inside my own abyss
trapped in the shell i'd made so thick
lifeless inside my corpse
Our Everyday Conversation
By Alexa Turczynski

Don’t tell me that you will love me this way forever,
Because that isn’t true.
Tell me instead that your love for me will change,
Will alter just as Shakespeare said it shouldn’t.
Tell me that you and I will change,
That we will forget all the promises we made,
And become so steeped in the everyday that loving
Doesn’t make sense any more.
Tell me that someday you might think you hate me.
That you’ll get so angry that you won’t remember
What it was that once made you say
You love me.
Tell me that you cannot promise me forever.
Tell me rather that you can only promise me today.
Today and today and today.
Tell me the truth and then I’ll know
That you’ll forever love me this way.
Bushy Eyebrowed Girl
Joseph Dodd
Mechanical Pencil
2010
The Woman’s Predicament
By Teresa Blackman

Some posit that it would have been impossible for a man to create the art of Georgia O’Keeffe, her paintings being intrinsically feminine. Such a claim asserts that gender can influence, and even limit, art, and indeed it seems odd to imagine a world with a female Beethoven or male Cather. Whether these artists present an impossibility or not, gender plays a role in the creation and form of art. The poetry of the trobairitz, or women troubadours, offers insight into the unique complications and differences of women’s art, particularly through its comparison to fin amour poetry by men. Male fin amour poetry is characterized by a particular admiration for an unattainable, beautiful woman; the male lover hopes to win the beloved. A female poet complicates this formula; how can she pursue being pursued? Now the poet, does she assume a different role or write different poetry? Each poet addressed this issue differently, leading to a wide variety of trobairitz voices. Unlike the troubadour poets, trobairitz had to be both subject and object, and thus their poems portray relationships between the lover and beloved that appear more complicated and reciprocal.

While it may seem that one of the trobairitz could simply switch the gender of the traditional fin amour players to create her poetry, many characteristics of both troubadour poetry and the woman’s station in medieval times inhibit such an easy swap. As unmarried women were of little importance during troubadour times, unless widowed, a woman’s value relied heavily on her relationships to men (Chaytor 15). The Occitan culture of the trobairitz was more hospitable to woman than surrounding cultures, and the poetry of the trobairitz suggests that a woman even had some choice regarding marriage (Amtower 868). As a young woman, Alaisina asks the older Carenza whether she should “take a husband / or remain a virgin” (“Na Carenza” 5-6). Carenza, advising marriage, implies that taking a husband has benefits for the young maiden; in marriage she can “bear the fruit of a glorious son,” whose goodness Carenza emphasizes in the repetition of “glorios” (15, 23). Not only the hope of offspring and the societal value of marriage in a woman’s life, but also the culture of courtly love of troubadours kept romance the main theme of the trobairitz (Chaytor 14-15, 20).

Unlike in troubadour poetry, inequality within marriage heavily influenced the poetry of the trobairitz. Laws, wherein the man could commit adultery (with an unmarried woman or under his own roof) with no punishment and the woman who committed adultery equaled a murderer, propagated such inequality (Paterson 232-233). Perhaps because of such laws, words relating to fidelity and infidelity appear often throughout the poems of the trobairitz, especially in comparison to the troubadour poetry (Bruckner xxiii). The trobairitz esteemed faithfulness and hoped for a marriage of equal friends.

But in their world, though, the relationship remained unequal, and her poetry could not mirror his. Without the male ability to act and pursue the beloved, her poetry could not fit the fin amour tradition. In his poetry, a trob-
badour admired a distant, beautiful lady. He moved through the roles of aspirant, supplicant, recognized suitor, and finally accepted lover in order to gain her admiration. Love and poetry became a game with the lady as object, embodying a set of ideals by her moral and physical perfection (Chaytor 16). The love, often mirroring that of the feudal system or one’s devotion to the Virgin Mary, remained intellectual and disincarnated, especially as he sometimes directed his affection to a married woman (Briffault 100; Chaytor 15, 17).

As the distant epitome of virtue, the woman could not easily switch roles and suddenly become the poet-lover. Her femininity neutralized any dominance she could have as poet, and simply in stating her desire, she became imperfect (Shapiro 561-563, Amtower 4). The woman troubadour must forfeit her fin amour role if she is to write poetry. Despite a small canon, the trobairitz combated this issue in many different ways, some poems even containing different voices to literally exemplify the difficulty of the woman’s position (Earnshaw 105). In order to fit traditional roles and assert her own form, the woman troubadour became the “femna, domna, and poet through the kaleidoscope of her songs,” wearing the role of longing lady, chaste beloved, and poet-lover (Bruckner 875).

The poems of the trobairitz show that they realized the impropriety of their art; inherent in the act of writing, the woman reveals a desire she should not (Amtower 3). Among other trobairitz who addressed this topic, Castel-loza, wrote, “I know this is a fitting thing for me, though everybody says it isn’t proper,” and later describes her messages as “a very poor example / to other loving ladies” (“Amics” 17-18, “Mout” 21-22). Other trobairitz even believed others thought the practice virtuous; La Comtessa de Dia says “a lady who reveals her love / hears virtuous, pleasant people / say only pleasing things about her” (“Ab ioi” 22-24). Another anonymous poet writes that she must speak, saying, “I can’t help it: I must speak my mind” (“No puesc” 1-2). In this instance, though, she speaks mostly of the hypocritical nature of the troubadours, perhaps suggesting that this different and less romantic topic has inspired increased confidence in emotional revelation.

The central difficulty of the trobairitz was to balance being both subject and object. In the fin amour formula and common practice, the woman was the object—the “desiring subject…[becomes] the desired object” (Shapiro 562). Though she also adopted a second role as poet, the trobairitz did not entirely eschew the typical fin amour role and on many occasions assumed the idealized pedestal. Alamanda suggests to a man that he agree with everything the woman says, even “if she tells you a high mountain is a plain” (“S’ie.us qier” 13-14). One anonymous poet repeats the refrain “I am lovely” (“Coindeta” 4). These and other forms of self-praise appear throughout the canon of the trobairitz. Educated women must have valued the mind, but they also valued physical beauty, particularly for gaining love. La Comtessa writes, “I am every bit as betrayed and wronged / as I’d deserve to be if I were ugly,” suggesting ugly women do deserve to be wronged—a harsh punishment for an unfortunate nose (“A Chantar” 6-7).

While some trobairitz were happy to stay on the elevated pedestal,
others took a more troubadour-like approach and sang of their own unworthiness and unfortunate state. Castelloza sings, “you deserve / a lady of higher lineage than mine” (“Ia de chantar” 26-27). Unlike the man, though, Castelloza could do little to prove her worth; she even realized “the more I sing / the worse it goes for me in love” (2-3). While poetry was an act of love for the troubadours, the trobairitz could not woo a man through words, for a man was able to actualize his poetic intentions, but “the woman’s poems…cannot claim to such an accomplishment” (Shapiro 565). Part of this difference arises from a woman being loved for virtue and a man for his service; poetry is no display of virtue and can win her no love (Bruckner 881). La Comtessa reminds the audience of the woman’s necessary inactivity, for she can only “pray” for the man to believe in her, contrasting the man who can duel or offer his poetry boldly (“Ab ioi” 29). Clara d’Anduza describes her anger when she cannot “with [her] verses, / accomplish what [she wishes]” (“En greu” 7, 9). One poet describes the difference between a man and woman, for “a lady simply doesn’t dare reveal / all she wishes, for fear that she may fail,” but as the male voice responds, he “can indeed take the risk” and act on his love (“Vos qem” 8-9, 15).

Unlike the man who simply desires, as both lover and beloved, the woman desires to be desired. La Comtessa wishes for one who “would have [her],” but in a later poem wishes to “have [him] in [her] power” (“Ab ioi” 10, “Estat ai” 18). She will be had and will have him. With the blending of subject and object, the resultant love becomes more equal.

Recognizing this accident of a more reciprocal and complicated romance, and perhaps desirous of a more equal love in an unequal society, the poetry of the trobairitz asks for equal friendship in love. In one tenso, a dialogue or debate poem, two voices argue this very topic: ought lovers be equal or serve the other? Here the man asks for equal love, saying “she should honor her lover on equal terms / because they are equally in love” (“Gui d’Ussel” 27-28). In another tenso, the lady asks her lover “why do you play lover / when you leave all the pain to me? / Why don’t we share it equally?” (“Amics” 5-7). Neither of these poems offers a definitive solution to the problem of equality within love, but the trobairitz, whether in the voice of the man or woman, at least attempt to ask why such equality seems impossible and believe equality something worth seeking.

Less idealized and hoping for equality, the trobairitz becomes closer to the audience than the domna. By revealing her desire and passion, she becomes imperfect (Amtower 4). La Comatessa writes of herself not as the chaste domna, but as promiscuous, hoping to “hold [her] knight / in [her] arms one evening, naked” (“Estat ai” 9-10). Another poet describes the sadness of leaving her love through the emotion and drama of the repeated refrain, “O God, O God, the dawn! It comes so soon” and the vivid, physical comparison to being inebriated, “I’ve drunk the sweet light of his breath” (“En un vergior” 4,19). Not only more erotic, but also more emotional, the trobairitz describe the torment of lost love as “great distress / …and grievous pain,” for “it crushes [her] to be so long without [him]” (“Amics” 1-2 and “Si.m fos” 40).
Though the *trobairitz* themselves are less idealized than the troubadour’s *domna*, the man does not fill her former role as mirror of virtue. Laurel Amtower asserts that a man becomes her “model in all emotional and moral aspects,” but this claim seems to lack widespread textual evidence as many *trobairitz* state conditions of their love and their superiority to men (8). In assessing the worthiness of a man, the *trobairitz* return to the role, as in a troubadour poem, of a discriminating beloved. She revels in her superior worthiness, as La Comtessa writes, “[I]t pleases me to outdo you in loving” (“A chantar” 11). Despite his faults, she desires his love and hopes he will lose his pride as she woos him through a catalogue of her good qualities (29-30). Loving only conditionally, La Comtessa will love “provided [she] find no fault in him” (29-32). Men must earn their worthiness as a condition of love. A man must not only be a gallant knight, but also a good poet and musician, suffering in patience for affirmation of her love (Briffault 87 and “Bona” 6). Though instances are few, some *trobairitz* speak of their own unworthiness. In utter despair, one writes, “I don’t think I’ll find a man in this world / as good, as cheerful, or as worthy as he was” and Castelloza laments that “[he] enjoy[s] a higher lineage that [hers]” (“Ab lo” 35-36 and ”Ia de” 27).

Complicated roles of being subject and object aside, the *trobairitz* has much occasion for joy, and their poems frequently remind the reader of this. Though in love, she never seems dependent on the man. One poet says that in the place of her heart, where no man has power, she’d “rather have a perfect joy from there / than have the person who so badly wants [her] body” (“Dieus” 7-8). Poems, especially of La Comtessa, end optimistically, perhaps because the poets realized anger stifled their creativity (Earnshaw 87, 148). No matter which voice one of the *trobairitz* chose, there seemed to be many avenues to happiness, whether it was the promiscuous lover, La Comtessa, or the almost man-abhorring lady, as was the anonymous poet just cited.

In her kaleidoscope of roles, the *trobairitz* show excellent skill in mastering their predicament. Not only do they write with formal astuteness on par with their male counterparts, but they also overcome and explain a far more complex social and romantic role (Earnshaw 81, 150). She explores her emotions with reason, and is not only conscious of her love, but also “requires mutual caring and equality of emotional response in each partner” (Earnshaw 81, 83). Though much of the poetry does not fit the cookie-cutter of *fin amour*, she creates forms and voices fitting to the situations. She can create “dramatic tension by caesural pauses and anaphora that reveals the obsession of desire” or can appear the calm, witty player in the argument of a *tenso* (Earnshaw 147). While asserting some independence from man through her confidence in her own virtue, she also reveals an independence of mind. Her rhymes are not the simple ones of a troubadour’s female voices, but more complex, even more so than the male (Earnshaw 150). Form and word choice reveal that these are not silly love songs, but the work of educated, thoughtful women. Even when stating the impropriety of her task, she makes clear its value (and perhaps disproves any claim on its impropriety) by her own verbal acuity. She conquers the difficulty of being both object and subject with joy, hopeful for a relation-
ship of reciprocity. From Jane Austen to romantic comedies, women have faced the same predicament of desiring to be desired. While few have met the task with the skill of the *trobairitz*, the endurance of their themes shows that, as both lover and beloved, the *trobairitz* had keen insight into the complexities of the female heart.

**Works Cited**


Kathleen Ramirez

*I Couldn’t Reach In, So It Reached Out*
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