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Cover: Geometric Visuals
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2014

Back cover: Unwinding Thoughts
Kathleen Ramirez
Stone Lithograph, Optical Fibers and LED
2014
Dear Readers,

In reading through this semester’s submissions, I am convinced yet again of the strength of the intellectual, artistic, and spiritual community of the University of Dallas. While our selected works are distinct in content and voice, they witness to the wholeness characteristic of liberal education, and participate in the deepest human conversations that great texts express. The editors for this semester’s Scholar were pleased to find a mirroring of the Core’s progression in the selections. Antonette Gallo takes up the Iliad with an insightful analysis of Homer’s heroic ideal in his portrayal of Hektor, showing the tension of loyalties within the human struggle. Zachary Willcutt delves into the philosophical origins of Kant, and shows the importance of recognizing the conversations that exist among the works of great thinkers. In a similar manner, Rachel Pauletti analyzes Russell Kirk’s understanding of Tocqueville, the thinker read in Principles of American Politics. Alex Taylor’s piece on Chesterton further confirms the importance of the dialogues that exist among thinkers, showing how Chesterton’s interpretations of Saints Thomas Aquinas and Francis of Assisi open up a deeper understanding of the traditions of Christianity. Our identity as a Catholic university is therefore celebrated in these selections, as in Matthew McKowen’s poem on human nature and salvation.

The contributions intelligently and artistically take up the great questions of human experience. Vallery Bergez, in her Sorensen Award winning essay on Marilynne Robinson’s Housekeeping, deals with the power of narrative to create completeness, to reconcile the fragments of human existence through storytelling. Theresa Sawczyn’s poem on an American World War II monument in France shows awareness of history and reverence for those whose sacrifices enable our pursuit of truth. Thomas Farris and Margaret Dostalik take up the universal topics of loss and the human effort to make sense of pain in their beautiful, though widely different poems. And calling to mind the influence of our Rome Program, Luke Pecha beautifully depicts the Fontana dei Quattro Fiumi.

Finally, the pursuit of truth is illustrated not only in the arts but also in the physical and life sciences, as in Michael Hoff’s scientific exploration on particle interaction and in Madeleine Ielmini’s research on genetic disorders.

All of the contributions speak to the astounding effort of a liberal arts education to create unity out of the disparate aspects of human existence through an awareness of tradition.

Alexa Turczynski
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In her critical essay, “Framing the Past,” Laura Barrett argues that, by examining the passages throughout *Housekeeping* in which Ruth views photographs, one sees that Ruth distrusts the supposed reality that a photograph depicts. For Ruth, photographs are limiting, confining, constraining. Barrett concludes that Ruth’s resistance to the containment of photographs reflects an all-encompassing resistance to any sort of containment (Barrett 95).

While it is undeniable that Ruth pushes against containment, particularly that of social expectations, I would argue that she actually embraces a certain form—that of the narrative. Insofar as a narrative has a definite structure (i.e. beginning, middle, and end) with certain technical traits, it poses limitations for the narrator. If Ruth truly rejects all forms of containment, which critics such as Laura Barrett and Maggie Galehouse suggest, then she would not impose restrictions on her experience by creating a narrative. Yet, she not only creates one, but she creates a deeply intimate one, in which she submerges the reader into her consciousness, abandoning much of a sense of privacy between herself and the reader. By imposing a narrative structure to her past, Ruth submits to containment, but not in a way that suffocates her experience.

Towards the beginning of the novel, Ruth asserts that “memories are by their nature fragmented, isolated, and arbitrary as glimpses one has at night through lighted windows” (Robinson 53). She searches for a way to de-fragmentize her memories, to provide a cohesion and unity to her experience. She reflects on this desire for unity later, which I will quote at length, to illustrate the progression of her meditative thoughts:

> Ascension seemed at times a natural law. If one added to it a law of completion – that everything must finally be made comprehensible – then some general rescue … would be inevitable. For why do our thoughts turn to some gesture of the hand, the fall of a sleeve, some corner of a room on a particular anony-

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**The Dr. Katherine Maren Sorensen Award for Excellence in the Study of the Novel**

The Katherine M. Sorensen Award recognizes one student in Literary Study II whose presentation reveals him or her to be a superior reader of the novel, exhibiting in his or her reading, writing, and delivery Katherine’s characteristic virtues: a precise intelligence and wit, a capacious imagination, and a humane learning.

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**“Wild Strawberries”: Craving Wholeness in Robinson’s *Housekeeping***

By Vallery Bergez
mous afternoon, even when we are asleep, and even when we are so old that our thoughts have abandoned other business? What are all these fragments for, if not to be knit up finally?

(92)

Memories may be fragmented, but Ruth envisions a final end of memory. The product of Ruth’s search for unity, for a final “knitting up,” is the narrative itself. By writing her own narrative, Ruth willingly places herself in a vulnerable position. The first-person narration implies Ruth’s active choice to tell her story. At first, she assumes a very reporter-like voice, seemingly detached and unemotional: “My name is Ruth,” she writes. “I grew up with my younger sister, Lucille, under the care of my grandmother, Mrs. Sylvia Foster, and when she died, of her sisters-in-law, Misses Lily and Nona Foster, and when they fled, of her daughter, Mrs. Sylvia Foster” (3). While the distance of her voice in these opening lines could, at first read, denote an unwillingness to be open with her reader, I would argue that it reflects the difficulty of entering into such an intimate relationship. By immediately divulging her background information, Ruth acquaints the reader with fundamental past experiences, a necessary foundation for the deep relationship that builds throughout the remainder of the novel.

Within these introductory pages, Ruth sets the backdrop for her narrative. She relates tragic events of the Foster family, to which she refers throughout the novel. After describing how her grandfather acquired a job with the railroad, she writes abruptly of his death: “[A]s he was returning from some business in Spokane, his mortal and professional careers ended in a spectacular derailment ... [I]t was not, strictly speaking, spectacular, because no one saw it happen. The disaster took place midway through a moonless night” (5-6). It is interesting that Ruth mentions that “no one saw it happen.” She admits that she has little credibility in reporting the train accident, but because she understands the importance of such a transformative event, she tells her reader everything she knows. In so doing, Ruth replicates the gaps within her own experience, which brings the reader to stand beside her. She uses the same narrative style even when she relates highly personal moments, such as her mother’s suicide. When she first explains what happened after her mother left the two girls on the grandmother’s porch, Ruth says unemotionally, “Then she went back to the car and drove north almost to Tyler, where she sailed in Bernice’s Ford from the top of a cliff named Whiskey Rock into the blackest depth of the lake” (22). There is a major narrative gap here, in that Ruth merely mentions her mother’s suicide; there is no detail at all. As the narrative gap functions in her telling of the grandfather’s death, so it functions here: Ruth herself does not know what exactly happened to her mother. Rather than including some sort of an emotional response, which the reader could reasonably expect, Ruth merely delivers the facts.
Her desire to share opens the door to an intimate relationship with her reader, which she develops with a close narrative voice, a voice that can come across as unemotional in relation to what she is telling. Ruth engages three different narrative styles, all of which serve to strengthen this intimacy. The first style places the reader inside narrative time; the second style lightly displaces the reader from narrative time; and the third completely displaces the reader from narrative time.

The first narrative style thrusts the reader directly into the narrative action. In such scenes, Ruth strictly delivers dialogue between other characters, situating the reader with herself— as an observer. The first instance of this style occurs when she records a conversation between Lily and Nona Foster, soon after their arrival in Fingerbone to take care of Ruth and Lucille (30-32). The dialogue takes up about two pages of text, and Ruth never attributes a speaker to any line. The only dialogue interruptions are vague observations: “There was a clucking of tongues,” “There was a silence,” “There was another silence,” “Someone got up from the table and put wood in the fire” (31). In such moments, Ruth steers away from personal commentary. The reader, in a sense, “hears” just what Ruth heard, and this unifies them in narrative time.

The second style does not remove the reader from narrative time, but it brings the reader somewhat beyond it, as Ruth describes a particular experience in such a way that incites the reader to share her responses. One of the most effective uses of this style is the trope of Fingerbone’s lake, an image which comes to develop multiple meanings for Ruth. Initially, the train accident renders the lake a mysterious presence: “It is true that one is always aware of the lake in Fingerbone, or the deeps of the lake, the lightless, airless waters below” (9). For Ruth, the lake represents a dark and unknown plenitude, full of a history that she never experienced; the lake is an enigmatic presence. Throughout the rest of the novel, it becomes increasingly eerie from Ruth’s personal experiences with it. When she goes out to the woods with Lucille, she writes of the lake’s singular presence: “Apart from the steady shimmering of the lake and the rush of the woods, there were singular, isolated lake sounds, placeless and disembodied, and very near my ears, like sounds in a dream” (115). The word choice of “placeless and disembodied” is apt, because, at the depths of the lake, there are placeless and disembodied souls. The connotative language with which Ruth consistently describes the lake brings the reader to attribute the same qualities to it, so that whenever the image appears, the reader senses the mystery and eeriness. When Ruth connects this idea of the lake to her mother, the language she used previously renders the image much more powerful. She compares thoughts to reflections on water and then writes, “I think it must have been my mother’s plan to rupture this bright surface, to sail beneath it into very blackness, but here she was, wherever my eyes fell, and behind my eyes, whole and in fragments, a thousand images of one gesture, never dispelled but rising always, inevitably, like a drowned
woman” (163). Ruth reiterates that, though the lake is full of death, the absence of life, it summons thought and memory. Her mother lies dead beneath the lake’s surface, but she is present in Ruth’s memory. In a way, the lake manifests “the life of perished things” (124), as a constant reminder of death and a constant instigator of meditation on death, which almost animates the dead within her narrative. Somehow, by drawing Ruth’s attention downwards (i.e., to the death that lies beneath it), the lake draws her attention to something beyond her, and Ruth’s language brings the reader’s attention to the same place.

In the third narrative style, Ruth draws the reader into her consciousness through her hyper-meditative language. These meditations take the reader out of narrative time, as Ruth becomes highly mystical. Her voice conveys a connection between her past experiences and her present thoughts. When she tells the story of the night she and Lucille spent on Fingerbone’s lake, Ruth reflects on her experience with darkness:

I simply let the darkness in the sky become coextensive with the darkness in my skull and bowels and bones. Everything that falls upon the eye is apparition, a sheet dropped over the world’s true workings … One is left with dreams that these specters loose their hands from ours and walk away, the curve of the back and the swing of the coat so familiar as to imply that they should be permanent fixtures of the world, when in fact nothing is more perishable (116).

Ruth strays from her story, moves out of narrative time, and plunges, with her reader, into a speculative meditation, which begins with an acknowledgement of the power of darkness, and which moves into a reflection on the instability of sight. Ruth concludes that what one sees in the world (such familiar sights as the form and movement of a coat, for example) is arbitrary. It is the darkness – when sight loses its power – that teaches her.

This hyper-meditative style often leads Ruth to delve into hypothetical abstractions. She will use phrases such as, “imagine that” and “say that,” to introduce a completely hypothetical scenario, again abandoning a sense of narrative time. In so doing, she enters into a beyond-ness, and the imperatives push the reader to join her. For example, “I toyed with the thought that we might capsize … Say that water lapped over the gunwales, and I swelled and swelled until I burst Sylvie’s coat. Say that the water and I bore the rowboat down to the bottom, and I, miraculously, monstrously, drank water into all my pores…” (162). Again, a page after the excerpt quoted above, Ruth writes, “Imagine that my mother had come back that Sunday, say in the evening, and that she had kissed our hair and that all the necessary business of reconciliation had been transacted between her and my grandmother, and that we had sat down to supper …” (195). But Ruth’s mother never returned; she drove off of a cliff into the depths of the lake. Ruth’s meditations press her imagination. She becomes so involved in this
beyond-ness, that she imagines what is not and what cannot be, and she engrosses the reader in Ruth’s imagination, so that the reader wonders and imagines with her. This unity consequently intensifies the intimacy between Ruth and her reader, and it is an intimacy which Ruth herself initiates.

The function of the imagination in Ruth’s re-telling of her experiences becomes most evident in the final scene of the novel. Lucille has left to live with her home economics teacher, and the town becomes concerned for Ruth’s well-being. In the penultimate chapter, the sheriff of Fingerbone comes to the house to check on Ruth, which makes Ruth and Sylvie fully realize the possibility of being separated. The final chapter begins with an image of the burning house, and Ruth explains with a finality, “Now truly we were cast out to wander, and there was an end to housekeeping” (209). Ruth never says goodbye to Lucille. The sisters, who are so deeply connected through shared tragedy, who were once a “we” and an “us,” are finally separated.

Ruth can only wonder about Lucille. She imagines (and tells the reader to imagine) a remarkably detailed ending for Lucille, waiting for a friend in a restaurant: “She is tastefully dressed – wearing, say, a tweed suit with an amber scarf at the throat to draw attention to the red in her darkening hair. Her water glass has left two-thirds of a ring on the table, and she works at completing the circle with her thumbnail” (218). The image of Lucille waiting for someone is crucial, because Ruth comments earlier that her “life seemed composed entirely of expectation. I expected – an arrival, an explanation, an apology” (166). Ruth never receives the arrival, explanation, or apology that she expects.

In this final imaginary scene, Ruth becomes the agent of this life of expectation for Lucille. She never arrives, never explains, never apologizes to Lucille for her sudden leaving; Lucille is left waiting and expecting. Thus, Ruth transmits her own life of expectation to the only other person who understands the losses she has experienced: Lucille. Lucille, too, must be waiting, and she is waiting for what will never come – say, Ruth and Sylvie, her mother, her grandparents (218). Ruth has Sylvie, but who does Lucille have? Ruth strives to stabilize Lucille in her memory, by creating an ending for her:

We are nowhere in Boston. However Lucille may look, she will never find us there, or any trace or sign … No one watching this woman smear her initials in the steam on her water glass with her first finger, or slip cellophane packets of oyster crackers into her handbag for the sea gulls, could know how her thoughts are thronged by our absence, or know how she does not watch, does not listen, does not wait, does not hope, and always for me and Sylvie. (219)
Ruth frames Lucille by giving her an ending, though it is an imaginary one. She ties up the last loose end of her memories. Lucille is stuck, waiting in a restaurant; Ruth has no perimeters (219). Lucille embraces the power of social structure; Ruth defies it. While Lucille may have a physical home and the stability that that provides (and even that is speculative), Ruth finds something lasting in her decision to lead a transient life, because she never pretends to find an arrival, an explanation, or an apology; she embraces the flux of her life.

In “Framing the Past,” Laura Barrett quotes Susan Sontag’s definition of a photograph: a photograph is “both a pseudo-presence and a token of absence” (Barrett 87). A photograph simultaneously produces a permanent recognition of a particular moment and signifies that that moment no longer exists. The words of Sontag and Barrett offer insight into how Ruth’s narrative operates. In one sense, her narrative provides a frame in which Ruth stabilizes her extremely unstable past; in another sense, it gives space to events and emotions that she has already experienced, the frame of which points out a boundary and a border. Thus, while Housekeeping makes permanent Ruth’s experiences, their containment within a narrative acknowledges that these experiences are complete.

Throughout the novel, Ruth actively searches for a way to “knit up” her fragmented memories. This fulfillment would signify a unity of fragments and would serve as a place of stability and wholeness; in a word, it would serve as a home. Ruth trusts that such a fulfillment is possible: When do our senses know anything so utterly as when we lack it? And here again is a foreshadowing – the world will be made whole. For to wish for a hand on one’s hair is all but to feel it. So whatever we may lose, very craving gives it back to us again. Though we dream and hardly know it, longing, like an angel, fosters us, smooths our hair, and brings us wild strawberries (Robinson 152-153).

Ruth has lost her grandfather, grandmother, father, mother, and sister. She longs for a wholeness and unity, and whether she intends it to or not, her narrative gives it to her. Because she craved it, it was given, and all in the telling of her story. Her narrative allows her to construct her home, the only place in which she truly belongs. She opens its door with the first words and fills it with all of the events, dialogue, meditations, and imaginings that follow. Her narrative is the angel that brings her wild strawberries.

Works Cited
Barrett, Laura “Framing the Past: Photography and Memory in Housekeeping and The Invention of Solitude.” South Atlantic Review, Vol. 74, No. 1 (Winter 2009), pp. 87-109
The Dichotomy of a True Hero
By Antonette Gallo

Homer recounts the lives of countless heroes throughout his epic poem, the *Iliad*. Most of these valiant men desire one thing above all else: τιμή. While Hektor, the champion of the Trojans, also covets this glory, his soul is not entirely focused on this desire. Because of his yearning for his family, Hektor’s inclination is dually-focused. The dichotomy of familial and militaristic life in Hektor’s character reveals his uncommon heroism. His dual nature is perfectly illustrated through his interactions with his wife, Andromache in Book VI of the *Iliad*.

The setting of Hektor and Andromache’s conversation suggests Hektor’s distinctive heroism. As Hektor walks through Troy in Book VI, he counsels his mother, Helen, and other Trojan women. However, Andromache is at the forefront of his mind. As he searches for her, Homer writes, “he in speed made his way to his own established dwelling, / but failed to find in the house Andromache” (6.370-371). Distressed at not finding his wife and child at home, Hektor, at the guidance of a serving woman, begins to search for her out by the gates to the plain. As Hektor vigilantly pursues her, Homer narrates, “…he had come to the gates…whereby he would issue into the plain, / there at last his own generous wife came running to meet him, / Andromache” (6.392-395). As Hektor and Andromache have their revealing conversation, Homer physically places Hektor halfway between the city and the plain’s gates, representing his dualistic concerns for both. He is shown to be literally wedged between two lives, caught in the middle of the intimate city and the death-ridden camp. It is also interesting to note that here, in the center of Hektor’s two lives, he finds his happiness and momentary rest from the pain of the war. Through this encounter, Homer demonstrates that Hektor is not disgruntledly torn between his two lives, but in fact, this is where he not only desires to be, but chooses to exist.

In addition to the setting of the encounter, Hektor’s conversation with Andromache depicts his dualistic desires. His love and concern for his wife are some of the many ways he is a distinctive hero. The reader rarely receives information about the other warriors’ families, and if he does, it is generally given by Homer, not the character himself. However, Hektor describes Andromache, as his first and preeminent concern, putting her not only above his city’s victory and fellow soldiers, but even above his parents (6.450-456). He tells her that it is her destruction that haunts him and he would in a heartbeat prefer his own death to her captivity (6.464-465). Andromache is Hektor’s life as he is hers. His love for her is not only outside of himself, but greatly surpasses every other conjugal relationship in the *Iliad*. While Hektor feels the pull of this encompassing love, he still cannot honor her tearful pleas to stay out of the fighting, safe with her. He tells Andromache, “All these / things are in my mind also, lady; yet I would feel deep shame / before the Trojans, and the Trojan women with trailing garments, / if I like a coward were to shrink aside...
from the fighting” (6.440-443). Hektor’s desires as a warrior are also potent and guiding. He craves honor, like other warriors, but at the same time wishes to calm Andromache’s stirring mind. These two longings capture Hektor’s character in a heartbreakingly beautiful way. Even the very language that he uses suggests his dichotomy. He tells his wife that he would feel shame before both the Trojan men and the woman. The two aspects of his city also rest on his shoulders as he speaks to his frantic wife. By outlining both of Hektor’s responsibilities, Homer illustrates his distinctive heroism.

Hektor’s dichotomy also reveals itself while he interacts with his young son, Astyanax. After comforting Andromache, Hektor turns to his child lovingly: “…Hektor held out his arms to his baby, / who shrank back… screaming, and frightened at the aspect of his own father, / terrified as he saw the bronze and the crest with its horse-hair” (6.466-469). Astyanax recoils from the terrifying and unrecognizable Hektor, dressed in his armor and frightening helmet. In this moment, Hektor is a warrior, separated from his family in a way that makes his child cow-er. However, remaining true to his dualistic nature, Hektor immediately softens himself, stepping back into the realm of fatherhood. Homer writes, “…and at once glorious Hektor lifted from his head the helmet / and laid it in all its shining upon the ground” (6.472-473). Hektor is able seamlessly and willingly to make the transition from fighter to father, being whatever is required of him. After picking up Astyanax, Hektor “lifted up his voice in prayer to Zeus and the other immortals …. ’some day let them say of him: ‘He is better by far than his father’”’ (6.475, 479). This prayer once again demonstrates Hektor’s dualism. He, as a hero, desires τιμή. In contrast to the other heroes who desire to be the most famous and honored men of all time, Hektor prays for this recognition for his son. It is not that Hektor only longs for some small measure of glory, but that he at the same time can be a warrior wanting glory and a father whose deepest prayer is for his son to surpass himself. Hektor’s relationship with his son further illustrates the dichotomy in his soul.

Through the character of Hektor, Homer explores a unique cast for the epic hero. Hektor finds himself placed between the demands of war and the duties he has to his family. By breaking away from the conventional ideas of Greek heroism, Homer constructs a uniquely human man, sympathetic and accessible to his reader. Hektor, though his interactions in Book VI, displays a redefinition of the customary heroic code, introducing concepts of spousal love and fatherhood to the usual criteria of bravery and physical prowess. By using Hektor’s love of family and dedication to honor, Homer fashions an exceptional and distinctive hero.

1. The immortalization and honor given by the gods for awe-inspiring and heroic actions.

Works Cited
Fountain of Four Rivers: Nile and Amazon
Robert Pecha
Graphite
2014
Charging and interaction of two-particle system within a glass box immersed in a low-vacuum argon plasma

By Michael Huff

Abstract

Due to Debye screening, the interaction between charged dust particles within a plasma may not be considered as a simple Coulomb force. In order to observe particle-particle interaction, the top particle in a vertical, two-particle chain within a glass box was pushed from its equilibrium position using a high-power Verdi laser, and as it returned to equilibrium, it interacted with the second particle. In order to isolate the particle interaction force, the electrostatic force and neutral drag force were subtracted from the net force acting on the particle by using a single particle undergoing damped oscillations in the box as a reference. The net electric field and drag force within the box were examined by forcing damped oscillations of a single particle, in the vertical direction, by an applied DC bias between electrodes and, in the horizontal direction, by laser-pushing. It was found that in both the horizontal and vertical dimensions the electric field depended linearly on the particle’s distance from its equilibrium position, and the coefficient to describe the field in turn had a linear dependence on plasma power. After isolating the particle-particle interaction force, what should be an equal and opposite interaction force between the particles was found to be asymmetric. Possible causes for this are discussed, with special attention devoted to the effect of the ion wake.

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The Spirit of American Youth Rising Above the Waves
By Theresa Sawczyn

This poem is about a statue (The Spirit of American Youth Rising Above the Waves) in an American cemetery in France for WWII American dead.

One strong arm reaches high above the foam,
To rise and touch the endless sky above
From the bloody fields of death below,
Watered with their selfless gift of manly love.

As under earth, linked again,
Hand in hand, and heart in heart,
Brothers intone, slowly softly- listen closely if you can!
“We are the twins, the Gemini,
Brothers once more-and now eternally- united
Brought back to sleep in one womb once more
As we did, so many years ago.”

When you visit their graves, to stare long in silence,
Repeat this in your heart, for it is true
And the voices of the ransomed living are better,
They sing praise better than a bugle could do.

“We gave up all our future days,
The days of joy and peace we could have known,
And all the days of daughters, sons unborn,
For you, mankind, we gave up all the world.”

“And yet, as bodies fell and hearts were stilled,
As once-kissed heads fell into pools of blood,
As life turned into streams and flowed away,
As young strong hands clutched vainly at the dust,
As foam rolled over our hundred-corpses,
And water-surf and sorrow- filled open mouths,
Our spirits rose triumphant from the spray
Icarus, whose new wings could never melt.”

“If only you, our people, could have seen,
If only- mother, father- then a comfort you would have felt
To see the Living Army rising from the waves-
The struggle over, the battle done,
Our mission accomplished and our war won-
To soar with strength and glory to the sun.”

“Still we listen, and we hear
As our ears unborn did long ago,
Yet now we hear, not war, not joy, not wails and wracking tears,
And dirges, playing mournfully below,
But silence—peace—as still as fallen snow.
And here, at least, we have conquered.
Here, at least, the war is won
For it was here the best of the world’s youth,
Rose from death to live in realms of sun.”

**Blood and Clay**
By Matt McKowan

From clay we were created,
The dust of the earth.
Father—Spirit moved the winds
Bringing man to his birth.

Creation made to live
Yet destined now to die,
To suffer and to laugh making
The most of this short life.

But we who are so blind
Close our eyes to all we see,
Building walls of barbed wire
Killing off beauty’s tree,

Whose roots dig down
Into gentle earth always,
Redeeming man through blood
That has soaked into the clay.
On Digging a Rabbit Hole
By Tom Farris

Between my two palms
A long wooden pole
With an iron end
Works.

Dirt.
It smells cold and fresh
Like mist condensed into solids
And mint made to beautiful mold.

The circle set,
Caked and clumpy
Like a too-floured baking pan,
Yet soggy, wet, and rich
With the filling of nutrients.

Bristles, fur, a face
Like a dappled paint-brush,
A lump weighty like a water-sack,
Its muscles long and line-like,
Its fur pelty like a carpet,
Like the dead,-mink coat on that rich lady
In the first Ghostbusters movie
That hissed horrifyingly to life….
I was afraid to touch it
Because I didn’t want to catch its
Disease – Death.

I couldn’t bury that rabbit,
But I did
Because that rabbit meant more
To me than I could guess,
Like my dead dog, my mutt Henry
With his wet, slobbery beard.
The Phenomenological Opening of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*
By Zachary Willcutt

Edmund Husserl is generally considered the founder of phenomenology, which he established through arguing for a return to “zu den Sachen Selbst—the affairs of consciousness,” taking the encounter with those affairs in reflective consciousness as the experiences of phenomenological research, and formulating the phenomenological attitude (Schacht 293, Churchill 80). By the study of the subjective states, or affairs, of consciousness from the perspective of the person experiencing such states, phenomenology grounds itself in this method of the examination of conscious experience from within the perspective of conscious experience. That which humans experience should be considered as “nothing more than phenomena in [their] ‘flow of experience,’” thereby restricting persons to consider “the phenomena which constitute [the] ‘flow of experience’ qua phenomena” (Schacht 299). This is the phenomenological attitude. However, perhaps current students of philosophy should reach into philosophy prior to Husserl, such as the transcendental idealism of Immanuel Kant when they seek to find the genuine roots of phenomenology, as Kant was the first philosopher to engage in a genuine phenomenological method, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*; for even in the beginning thereof, Kant sets forth the phenomenological method and thereby transcends the divide between continental rationalism and British empiricism.

The specific passage under consideration contains the following section of the first page of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which states:

There can be no doubt that all knowledge begins with experience. For how should the faculty of knowledge be called into activity if not by objects which affect our senses, and which partly produce representations by themselves, partly rouse the activity of our understanding to compare...these representations, and thus to convert the raw material of our sensible impressions into a knowledge of objects which we call experience. With respect to time, therefore...all knowledge begins with experience. But although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises from experience. (CPR B1).

This beginning employs the phenomenological method in a primitive but recognizable form, since its basic appeal is to that which has been revealed in experience, rather than to any preconceived theories. Kant moves to examine the question of knowledge apart from a particular prior structure with which he will analyze his experiences, and consequently he avoids distorting the latter through the inevitable color that would have been imposed by an artificially imposed structure. The claim that “there can be no doubt that all knowledge begins with experience” is an invitation to the reader to examine his own life as it is apprehended by him, to determine whether this assertion is valid. Kant does not provide a logical argument to
defend this contention, despite its laying much of the groundwork for the Critique. It is left open for the reader to affirm or to deny. If the reader denies it, the rest of the Critique will rest on an uncertain if not a false premise. The remainder of the paragraph immediately following this initial statement is not an argument for the statement itself, but a clarification and explanation thereof. Kant describes in particular what his first statement means, that the consciousness is called into activity by particular objects encountered in the perceived world that produce representations while also simultaneously activating mental processes regarding such representations, ending in the production of a knowledge of objects that is experience. Knowledge does not exist apart from experience; the conscious individual only becomes conscious of knowledge with experience, when it is initially encountered. The subject never has knowledge without objects of knowledge, without experience; the subject is never conscious without being conscious of a thing, of an object, which is encountered in experience. Knowledge does not appear by itself, apart from an experienced object. There is no purely logical argument behind this claim, for it is grounded in the basic character of experienced life, which is not first known by the subject in the form of a syllogism, but instead as an experienced object of which we have knowledge. Knowledge assumes an object of knowledge, given in experience. This approach is phenomenological by reflecting upon the processes that occur in the experience of the world in consciousness. Kant examines by reflection the affairs of consciousness to determine that knowledge arises with experience; similarly, Husserl, in *Logical Investigations*, argues that the description of an experienced object being experienced by an experiencing I only takes place at a reflective level, for “the description [is performed] after an objectifying act of reflection, in which reflection on the ego is combined with reflection on the experienced act” (LI 561-2). Therefore, the “original act is no longer simply there, we no longer live in it, but we attend to it and pass judgment on it,” meaning that reflection on encountered experiences reveals the manner in which the ego encounters the world – the phenomenological method (LI 562).

In holding that knowledge begins with experience and always derives its object from experience, Kant is acknowledging a level of validity in the position of Empiricism; he is admitting the primacy of experience, and thereby declaring his own starting point to be experience and that which is experienced. The subject is only cognizant of its knowledge through the means of experience, without which it would not have any knowledge whatsoever. *The Critique* does not start with a presupposition that knowledge has a particular definition; it begins with an observation upon how the subject experiences its own knowledge. To divorce knowledge of experience is to slide into rationalism, as expressed by the stance of Rene Descartes. Kant is rejecting the Cartesian method of the Meditations on First Philosophy that considers the consciousness and knowledge as separate and divisible from that of which the subject is conscious and that which is known by
the subject. He rejects such theorizing on the basis of the way in which knowledge is primordially encountered—arising with experience, alongside experience, and not independent of experience, contradicting Descartes, who begins by discarding all propositions that contain any doubt, “by casting aside all that admits of the slightest doubt, not less than if I had discovered it to be absolutely false” (Meditations, 79). Among that which is doubtful, consequently, is the evidence of sensation: “I suppose…that all the things which I see are false (fictitious)” (M, 79). All qualities, characteristics, and natures associated with experience are held as being only “fictions of my mind” (M, 79). Consciousness is therefore separated from that of which it is conscious, that which is encountered in experience. For there must surely exist an I that is persuaded that there is nothing real in order for there to be a persuasion of the falsity of the experienced world, such that “Doubtless…I exist, since I am deceived” (M, 80). The act of being deceived assumes the existence of a deceived subject, the I. Descartes proceeds to consider his own I, as a consciousness of being deceived. He is conscious that he is something, a being deceived, and he will therefore never imagine himself to be nothing. For him to be conscious that he is something, though, is for him to be conscious of himself; consciousness has been reflected back upon itself. Since he maintains that the experienced world is dubious, then, he is examining the conscious subject qua conscious subject. The Cartesian cogito ergo sum isolates the subject by itself, apart from its experiences, in a tendency that is wholly foreign to it. Knowledge is detached from its object that comes in experience, i.e., knowledge loses its character as coming into consciousness alongside objects empirically given. If the subject returns to its own experience, it never can recall having had knowledge absent empirical givens; there universally at every moment of consciousness is the presence of experience, about which there is knowledge, which is not encountered without the simultaneous objects of experience. Cartesian Rationalism, in its deconstruction of the tendency in which the subject has knowledge, as the very result of this deconstruction, is unable to provide an experientially adequate account of knowledge, as it begins with artificial premises that lock the consciousness reflectively in its own self.

However, Kant also does not simply fall into Empiricism; for the opening claim of The Critique is qualified by “it does not follow that [knowledge] arises from experience,” which again reveals a phenomenological method. That knowledge begins with experience does not therefore indicate that experience causes knowledge in itself substantially, that is, knowledge is not so much generated by experience as it is activated by such or is the combination of the data thereof with concepts furnished from the understanding. The Critique refuses to take the unjustified leap from the proposition that knowledge is only encountered in and with experience to the claim that knowledge arises from experience, i.e., it is reducible to sensation, as Locke maintains in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: “In [experience] all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself” (HU, 53). Observation, of either “external sensible objects” or “the internal
operations of...[the] mind" “supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking” (HU, 53). Thus, there are two sources of knowledge, sensation, of purely material objects, and reflection, of mental activity considered as its own object. Yet, the second may be reduced to the first, since a man only has ideas “when he first has any sensation” (HU, 64). Only sense-perception, then, gives the mind the ideas of which it is conscious, the ideas that bring it into operation, allowing it to then reflect upon itself in order to provide knowledge by reflection. No aspect of knowledge is a priori; it is solely a posteriori. But such claim imposes causality where no causality as such is given. All that is encountered is that we do not have knowledge and experience apart from one another, which is to say, knowledge with experience; this adopts the phenomenological method by appealing to what is experienced, and only to that which is experienced, while resisting the temptation to impose concepts onto the situation. Kant seeks to let the situation manifest itself from itself, out of which will be derived concepts. Such concepts will thus fit the situation as it has revealed itself to the subject. This particular process also lets the First Critique permit a certain rationalism: there is more to knowledge than that given in mere sensation, meaning that the subject also has a fundamental role in the act of experience. The empiricist postulate of Tabula Rasa, the primal blank state of the mind that passively receives percepts, is entirely rejected, in favor of the recognition that the subject conditions that which it knows. Knowledge is not as simple as the opinion of Empiricism, reducing it to mere sensation, or to that of Rationalism, reducing it to mere thought-in-a-vacuum. Kant has set forth a middle path that synthesizes the two primary epistemological schools of the Enlightenment, through holding that knowledge is brought into awareness by experience and simultaneously conditioned by the subject itself.

The principle difficulty of the argument that Kant is using a phenomenological method is that before the end of the first paragraph, he states that the understanding “convert[s] the raw material of our sensible impressions into a knowledge of objects which we call experience.” This is problematic from the perspective of Husserl, who maintains that the raw object is never encountered; there is no experience of a pure object, no experience divorced of meaning. The raw sensible object is only intended, since “even the sensuous form is not an actual part of vital experience” (Shorter Works, 70). In life, the sensible object qua sensible object is not part of that which is encountered in consciousness. It is only intended in the description of the how of sensible experience. The phenomenological method reveals as much; when the subject consults his own experience, he may observe that he never has encountered at any point raw sense data. The encountered thing is the object itself of knowledge as it appears to the conscious subject. Introducing raw sense data into an explanation of conscious experience is a movement foreign to the problematic, an intrusion of concepts to the encountered situation that are not in fact given in the encountered situation, and thus, phenomenology has rejected the notion of “the raw material of our sensible impressions.” But Kant has stated that
there is a raw material of sensible impressions; therefore, he is not using the phenomenological method as such, he having posited something more than what is given in lived experience.

This objection, though, is insufficient to reject that The Critique in its beginning employs the phenomenological method as its general approach, upon the grounds of two separate reasons. The first is that taken simply, the Critique appeals to ‘experience,’ the basic experience of the person in his own life. By consulting his own experience, he will assent to the validity of the claim that all knowledge arises with experience, with an object. Similarly, Husserl starts with ‘lived experience,’ stating that a phenomenon, an object, is “something having…those determinations with which it presents itself in consciousness,” that is, how it is experienced (SW, 12). The difference is nominal; these terms both refer to the same totality: the conglomeration of particular concrete events that compose the situations encountered by consciousness as its life, its experience, flows before it (LI, 561). From the starting point of basic experience, Kant draws the conclusion that knowledge is only given with experience, that is, with an object; similarly, from the starting point of lived experience, Husserl, maintains that consciousness is always consciousness of a thing, never stripped of objects of which it is conscious (SW, 23). Implicitly, though, this indicates that knowledge, being an entity that exists within consciousness, which itself only arises with lived experience and the objects thereof, also must have an object and arise with experience. Kant and Husserl both agree upon this basic Kantian Transcendental and phenomenological initial point of reference for their respective investigations.

The second reply to the counter-argument that the Kantian understanding of perception is not phenomenological is that The Critique does not claim that humans in lived experience actually encounter the raw sense object; instead, Kant is referring to the physical act of sense-perception, not consciousness of the encountered world, of which the body of the subject is a part. With respect to the corporeal generation of the percepts of entities in space and time, there is indeed raw sense data, which enters into the subject by physical senses, sensation; such is then reproduced in the imagination as an image; and finally ends in being endowed with a concept in the understanding, by which an entity becomes recognized (CPR A125). Only the latter category, though, constitutes physical objects as they are encountered in the world; that is, meaningfully, in consciousness, having already been acted upon when the conscious subject becomes conscious of them in the understanding (CPR A125). Here Kant foreshadows the noesis, the rays of attention always already going out to the object, the noema, as it is encountered by consciousness, as described later by Husserl. Therefore, transcendental idealism and phenomenology do more than coincide in their methods; the former goes so far as to prefigure the latter, since both are grounded in the analysis of the stream of conscious experience as it presents itself to the subject, that is, consciousness and knowledge arising with experience.
The Role of GRK4 in Bladder Exstrophy-Epispiadias Complex
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ABSTRACT
The object of this research was to identify the effects of G Protein-Coupled Receptor kinase 4 (GRK4) gene mutations found in Bladder Exstrophy-Epispiadias Complex (BEEC) patients on protein function by measuring cyclic AMP (cAMP) levels of cells containing mutated GRK4 transcripts. BEEC is a congenital anomaly of the urinary tract that occurs for 1 in 20,000 to 80,000 births ¹. However, in families with a previous occurrence of BEEC, the incidence is 1 in 100 births ², a significant increase over the population incidence, indicating a possible genetic factor. Analysis of array Comparative Genomic Hybridization (aCGH) results from a BEEC patient population revealed a patient with a microduplication encompassing the (GRK4) gene. Copy number variations (CNVs) of GRK4 are rare in the general population, with a frequency of 0.162% (https://decipher.sanger.ac.uk). Ten patients with urological defects, mainly of the kidney and bladder, were identified as having CNVs containing GRK4. The low frequency of CNVs containing GRK4 and their association with urological defects makes GRK4 a promising candidate for study. GRK4 is one of six members of a G protein-coupled receptor kinase family that desensitizes activated, agonist bound G protein-coupled receptors (GPCR) through phosphorylation. GRK4 is known to phosphorylate the dopamine D1 receptor, which leads to a decrease in cellular levels of cAMP. Sequencing and analysis of patient DNA revealed four patients with potentially dangerous mutations in the GRK4 gene.

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Garnering immense popularity in the 1950s, Alexis de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* was picked up by Americans and promulgated as a Cold War text. In a world of rampant socialism, a world which had lived through and was still to endure the most vicious and brutal of totalitarian regimes which the earth had seen, Tocqueville’s sagacious insights on America, and those concerning the despotism of democracies, necessitated revisiting. It is no matter of coincidence, then, that Russell Kirk set Tocqueville, that pupil of Burke, in the crown of his 1953 tome *The Conservative Mind*. But Kirk’s tradition, a Conservative Anglo-American one, is also a Burkean one, full of aristocratic sensibilities and lamentation, and it is one informed by the political and social realities of the 1950s; this two-fold influence bears heavily on Kirk’s portrayal of Tocqueville. Kirk too broadly and too swiftly attempts to dichotomize Tocqueville’s thought, straining out almost all of the nuances that Tocqueville displays in his *Democracy*. Kirk also fails to consider Tocqueville’s curious regard for the American democrat, with his tempered materialism coupled with self-interest well understood, his exalted spiritualism contingent with it, and Tocqueville’s fascination with the drama of the conjugal union, with its own formative role in society as a perpetuator of freedom, mores, and as a prop to civil and social order.

Kirk curiously begins his examination of Tocqueville’s thought backwards by listing, rather extensively, those vices of a despotic democracy that Tocqueville examines in volume two of *Democracy in America*: a collectivist state, guided by planning bureaucrats, where persons are all made equal in their baseness and mediocrity—dehumanized; where man is robbed of his freedom to choose and eventually to do; where materialism obsesses the “public consciousness” and eventually becomes the sole, secular “object of their existence.” (Kirk, 183) Supernatural motives and moral striving vanish from sight, the exercise of virtue eschewed, and simplification, centralization, and standardization then follow.

But then Kirk turns to the first volume of *Democracy*, to list, quite briefly, the props to order and liberty that temper a democratic state. Religion establishes its indirect rule in men’s hearts, tempering their materialism and self-love; laws and mores impose habitual limitations on “popular affections” and passions; an artificial aristocracy of class and talent and public education are weaker props; but “above all,” even above
religion according to Kirk, the greatest prop to order is “to encourage and shelter individual differences, variety of character,” and that “high human striving” that set individuals apart (Kirk 193).

Kirk’s deep love of Edmund Burke skews his vision regarding Tocqueville. Kirk, although he esteems Tocqueville, still considers him a “gentile,” an outside convert to the conservative tradition. And while he offers a good explication of Tocqueville’s thought concerning democratic despotism, Kirk strives to fit Tocqueville into his Burkean schema by stripping Tocqueville of all his nuances which make him a liberal conservative. Kirk looks unfavorably on democracy, making it solely a subject of lamentation, its people rude and always tending to disorder. He may be right. But Tocqueville sees and even admires certain things in the democratic people of America—American materialism tempered by self-interest rightly understood, American spiritualism and restiveness, and the emphasis on the conjugal union—in which he finds not simply solace, but hope.

As equality increases in a democratic society, men, due to an increasing lack of stratification and rigidity in society, grow less and less concerned with other particular men and more concerned with the whole. Since personal responsibilities vanish, men can concern themselves more with their own self-interest. This can and does lead to individualism; which can be deadly to the human person and to society. But American self-interest is rather different. Although concerned with their own desires, Americans are somehow able “to combine their own well-being with that of their fellow citizens;” and while not sacrificing themselves for great or glorious ends, they do it all the same considering “such sacrifices as… necessary” both for themselves and for those who profit from them. (Tocqueville, DA, 2.2.8.501.) It is not the Americans’ glory to be righteous, but if they can do something that benefits both them and society at large then it is enough although not perfect.

But to confine this good self-interest to only material ends would still leave man in the materialistic quagmire Kirk despairs of. Fortunately, this self-interest nicely reconciles itself with religion. Religion employs interest to assure man that the sacrifices accomplished in this world garner recompense in the next; but religion transforms self-interest into something more. A charity towards one neighbor develops, an agape, a giving of oneself for the benefit of others. Man through his thought “sees that the goal of God is order” and he takes on this divine plan with astonishing zeal, waving any sort of recompense aside (Tocqueville, DA, 2.2.9.505).

Yet the American is not content to gaze solely at heaven with the raging intensity of a saint: he seeks happiness in this life as well. And so
he fixes his gaze upon those material enjoyments which can grant him increasing comfort and can decrease his inconveniences. Rich and poor alike constantly see something more that could comfort them and they go about their lives in agitation, but not disorder. Thankfully, this pursuit of material enjoyments “needs order to be satisfied,” supports mores on account of their usefulness “to public tranquility and…industry,” and “comes to be combined with a sort of religious morality” (Tocqueville, DA, 2.2.11.509).

Still, a restlessness reigns in the soul of the American but not a wholly materialistic or Marxist restlessness. Rather, when the American mournfully declares “I have not that which I desire,” it reechoes from a much deeper part of his soul. Tocqueville claims that this restlessness, or inquietude, can serve as a useful and not altogether bad means to a supremely high end, to a remarkable human striving. The desire for the sublime did not come from man but is inscribed in his very nature before he was born: he cannot help it. But upon sinking into a material ennui, his agitation pricks him to look upwards and he does so with an unmatched impetuosity.

“Uniformity is the death of high human striving,” says Kirk and even Tocqueville, for the most part, concurs (Kirk, 193). And yet, in bleakness of this materialistic America, Tocqueville discerns a wonder. Since all Americans concern themselves, almost wholly, with material pursuits, it seems almost natural for a vast and ecstatic reaction to occur in the hearts of certain men. Somehow, the highest of all high human striving occurs: wide-eyed mystics, saints, race unfettered to the immaterial; and as they are revered, there then exists some consciousness that they achieved something that all men are called to strive for. They grasped at the divine with an unmatched eros and they succeeded.

Tocqueville discerns good, even admirable, things in the American democratic regime, too many to recount in this essay. Kirk, however, does not and I think it a product of Burke and the aristocratic, conservative mind which I revere; however, in democratic societies, I doubt the efficacy of those aristocratic institutions to preserve order and liberty. However, an aristocrat by birth and even temperament, while he also despairs and even despises some aspects of this democracy, Tocqueville deeply admires the liberty offered by a democratic society: the liberty to bind oneself. This liberty is not new for it has existed since Eden. But it takes a much more prominent position in the hearts of democratic peoples and it reveals a new and more complex prop to social and civil order: the family.

The family of Burke was a Roman family: it operated on a principle of pity—for one’s children and those yet unborn—and piety—for
one’s elders and those now dead. Man exercised his pity and piety under the auspices of the father, a god-like figure to whom all relations were directed and through whom all other relations, whether divine, social, or bureaucratic, could occur. Ensconced in stratifications, one directs his pity and pity upwards and downwards to each particular society. But in a democracy, man comes to God with no intermediary and he comes away with a more general pity towards all mankind, to every member of the human race. The Roman pater was robbed of his potestas and his sons could esteem him as just an older citizen. The hearth changes but, Tocqueville believes, for the better. Equality of conditions allows for an increased sweetness and familiarity between a father and his children, removing those dominating patriarchal strictures and letting the father be a father.

Tocqueville switches the family dynamic from the drama of the father to that drama of the conjugal union and he does so through a heightened attention on the American woman. A complexity of nature and nurture, the American woman, exposed from a very young age to “the vices and perils that society presents”, confronts the world with a firm knowledge and inner strength (Tocqueville, DA, 2.3.9.563). Her horizons are laid out in front of her: cost, benefit, options, and happiness are all weighed in her own prudent balances. And then she chooses, coolly, to bind herself as wife, but nevertheless maintaining her pride and independence. She becomes mistress of herself, exercising that self-interest rightly understood, and, more importantly, she recognizes her societal role as wife, mother, and, then, as creator of mores and stabilizer of society.

American religious institutions do not, nor can ever again, hold that sway which the Churches of the Old World held on governments. Its direct sway defeated, then, religion attempts an indirect approach through the hearts of women and, ultimately, the family. Religion cannot direct or hold influence “on the laws or…political opinions” but above all it “directs mores and it is in regulating the family that it works to regulate the state.” (Tocqueville, DA, 1.2.9.278) It is the woman who creates mores and through her role as wife and mother she exercises those mores and imposes them upon her family. The family then becomes the great nexus of social and civil life and one of the great props to order. The order and peace a man finds in his home he savors as good; he desires the tranquility, stability, and longevity that he finds in his family and furthers this good by applying it to his government.

Kirk’s is a good portrait of Tocqueville. The French gentile shares that deep fear of democratic despotism and mediocrity which threaten to plunge the world into a blank, abject chaos of dullness and fear. But Tocqueville’s curious playfulness and wonder illuminates those cor-
ners of the democratic mind, which, although in some cases lack the art-
fulness and gravity of an aristocratic society, nevertheless are honest,
plain, useful, and ultimately good. And Tocqueville loves them for that.

Notes
1. Tocqueville, DA, 2.2.8.502: “The doctrine of self-interest well under-
stood…cannot by itself make a man virtuous; but it forms a multitude
of citizens who are regulated, temperate, moderate, farsighted, mas-
ters of themselves; and if it does not lead directly to virtue through the
will, it brings them near to it insensibly through habits.”

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GK Chesterton wrote sketches of two different saints, *St. Francis of Assisi* in 1923 and *St. Thomas Aquinas* in 1933. Chesterton’s portrayal sought to counter the romantic adoption of the former and the popular ignorance or else disdain of the latter; he did so by filling out his portraits with the Christian metaphysics that united the two saints in their work, a work they pursued in quite different ways, but a work that Chesterton asserts to be “the same work; the work that has changed the world” (425). Their work was the real Reformation of cleansing the stables of antiquity, purging the temples of Christendom of the smoke of paganism, through the rechristening of sun and moon as brother and sister in creation, and the baptism of Aristotle so as to conform him to Christ and rescue him from the blood red crescent flag. Their work was a real liberation, in that Francis freed Nature from her pagan and pantheist associations, in that Thomas freed the senses from the existential doubt of sight and smell. Their work was the real dawn of the fullness of the Christian metaphysical vision, which in distinguishing God from his creation, allowed creation to be seen as such, and thus rationally understood. In doing so, they defended common man’s common sense and allow him to trust his senses and trust his God in harmony.

In the first chapter of his *St. Thomas Aquinas*, “On Two Friars,” Chesterton asserts that the two saints stand parallel in their joint work because they actually are the sidepieces of a triptych, with the middle section being the Incarnate God, Jesus Christ. In 1925, in the time between his publication of *St. Francis* and *St. Thomas*, Chesterton published *The Everlasting Man*, his study of the Incarnate Christ in relation to the spiritual history of man which is most truly the outline of history. From this center of all history do the two saints take their marching orders and their strength; Chesterton makes clear in his biographies that the revolution effected by St. Francis and St. Thomas depended on their visible orthodoxy and sanctity; a foundation upon which what seemed like rickety rafters of unorthodoxy to some of their contemporaries were found to be houses built on stone and not sand. In Chapter 4 of *St. Thomas*, “A Meditation on the Manichees,” Chesterton asserts that St. Thomas “was truly the godfather of Aristotle, he was his sponsor; he swore that the old Greek would do no harm; and the whole word trusted his word,” “precisely because his personal Catholicism was so convincing” (492). Similarly, Chesterton suggests that in St. Francis’ imitation of Christ, the riddles and hard sayings of Galilee were answered in Umbria, such that “a secret has been handed down in one religious tradition and no other” (104).
Chesterton asserts that the secret that was handed down in the Christian tradition, especially through the work of these two saints in the world of the worldly and the world of the mind, was that great philosophical suggestion, the creatio ex nihilo, the radical distinction between the Creator and the creation. This suggestion of Christianity solved the cramped cosmology of the pagans, and showed Nature to be a rational creation rather than an irrational goddess. This philosophical doctrine is central to the Christian faith as it is necessarily presupposed by the Incarnation; the meaning of God coming in flesh to redeem his fallen creation makes sense only if God himself was immune to the Fall, if God is not simply a part or the whole of the cosmos. The high point of this distinction is the free will of man, which is compromised in both Islam and Buddhism, as in the former man loses his freedom in submission to an absolute Will which is utterly incomprehensible, and in the latter man loses himself in absorption into Nothing, where he may will no longer. According to Chesterton, the importance of the distinction between God and man, Creator and creation, is that “it is distinction and not division; but a man can divide himself from God, which, in a certain aspect, is the greatest distinction of all” (435).

While this suggestion is reasonable, reason struggled for centuries but did not find it, and it is thus that St. Thomas’ assertion of the necessity of revealed religion finds its place in history and its justification. The distinction between man and God finds fulfillment in the communion of creation and Creator, as indeed the Incarnation brought about this understanding and generated the missionary impulse necessary for it to spread. If St. Francis could bring man to regard sun and moon, fire and water as his brothers and sisters, it was indeed only because a man much like Francis, but possessing a dignity fully divine, brought men to call God Father. This was the culmination of the work of the Spirit in pagan centuries, as St. Thomas’ rehabilitation of Aristotle was only possible because the same Spirit of Truth spoke in a limited way in that Greek of common sense who spoke fully through the Church founded on the rock of St. Peter after His outpouring on Pentecost.

Works Cited

“Regret in Triplicate”
By Margaret Dostalik

I
No need of locks for envined gates curled shut
Since none shall try the handle covered in shoots,
And no one knows the words obscured that cut
Its soft unlasting bolts, Who can hear those flutes
That tremble dimly somewhere far away
And swiftly pass, as a sinking maze of roots
Fades into earth. My thoughts begin to fray,
Snagged in vain on the nail of what is not
And pulled by what is. Yet even so, I pray
My mind won’t snap adrift, however taut.
Thus mad, I strive to weave a tighter knot.

II
They say that loss enkindles bright desire,
Sails ships, inflames both blood and homes with fears
Of loss renewed, that fevered pulsing fire
Consuming all your rest with smoking tears
Without regret. Resist it, deny the heart
Such comfort. You cannot flee or fight these fears.
As a birch withstands the aether’s flashing dart,
So you keep still while wind and water brawl
Through twitching leaves. All things must die, must part.
Be patient. Though loss within your bones may crawl
—so hard to fight such grief—it too must fall.

III
When autumn wrapped in fading robes of green
First lets them fall and shows her golden skin,
Against my will I dream of how I’ll keen
If you are gone; here lies my darkest sin,
My impiety—although I’m not your blood—which tears
Itself to rags to mourn its only kin:
That selfish still, I weep for my pain, my cares,
And not for you, my mother. Did I leave to find
Alluring phantoms which snatched my heart with snares?
Yet I must keep down this path which used to wind
Round sunny thoughts, but now stumbles blind.